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Contributions of Lesser Developed Nations to
International Law: The Latin American Experience
by Frank Griffith Dawson*
I. INTRODUCTION
A LTHOUGH THE EXISTENCE of doctrines, practices and
principles peculiar to Latin America has been acknowledged for some
years by the international legal community, scholars generally have never
considered Latin America a major participant in the formulation of wider
international principles. Such an oversight is unfortunate and unjustified.
One need only consider briefly United Nations efforts proclaiming
and purportedly regulating the New International Economic Order to re-
alize that long-standing Latin American legal preferences on the equality
of states, sovereignty, ownership of natural resources and compensation
for nationalized foreign property are imbedded throughout the Declara-
tion on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order' and
the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.' That these instru-
ments do not constitute binding legal principles is immaterial. They crys-
tallize the aspirations of a significant portion of the Third World, which
increasingly looks to Latin America for leadership.
Some of the issues and problems raised by Latin American contribu-
tions to international law have already been discussed in print, but only
as individual, isolated topics. Specific articles have expounded upon the
exhaustion of local remedies rule, state responsibility, nationalization,
sovereign immunity, diplomatic asylum, Decision 24 of the Andean Com-
mon Market, the law of the sea, the Calvo Clause and the New Interna-
tional Economic Order. Little attempt, however, has been made to
demonstrate the inter-relationship between them and their common roots
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in regional history and aspiration.
This article does not purport to provide a comprehensive analysis of
Latin America's contributions to international law. Rather its aim is to
survey the principle areas of impact and to suggest a framework for the
future research necessary to remedy the gap in our appreciation of the
roles regional international legal systems can play in forming and influ-
encing a wider, more universal system of legal prescriptions.'
II. SOVEREIGNTY, EQUALITY AND CONFRONTATION
Since independence two persistent themes, sovereignty and the
equality of states, have supported and connected virtually all Latin
American" legal positions on a variety of issues. The historical durability
of these themes relates directly to Latin American attempts over 150
years to compensate for their politically and economically weak and un-
stable condition by asserting and codifying as international law, stan-
dards of behavior which they hoped would shield them from external po-
litical and economic aggression.
Whether the perceived threats derived from Spanish desires to re-
cover lost colonies, English designs on their trade and resources, or U.S.
intervention in Latin America, these themes have been consistently main-
tained and asserted by Latin American representatives on regional and
international bodies and tribunals. To a surprising degree their efforts
were successful. "The appeal to general rules and principles of law often
served to shift attention away from the circumstances of the general case,
and to give time for passions to cool. In the realm of legal dialectics the
Latin American statesmen won many more victories than they ever could
have on a trial of physical strength."
Today, Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
includes among sources of international law: treaties, state practice, and
the writings of the qualified publicists. Although Latin Americans have
greatly enriched these sources, their contributions have all resulted from
' A more comprehensive, extensive study is being prepared by the author under the
auspices of the Procedural Aspects of International Law Institute. That study, to be pub-
lished in book form, will also explore Latin America's impact on private international law in
such fields as the codification of international commercial and procedural State practice, not
only in regional documents such as the Bustamente Code, but in broader international con-
ferences and conventions on, for example, recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
and international legal assistance.
4 "Latin America" as used herein refers only to those nations with an Iberian back-
ground, namely, Mexico, the Five Central American Republics, Panama, the Dominican Re-
public, Cuba and the ten South American States, but even with this limitation the phrase
must still refer to nineteen nations which vary considerably in history, geography, popula-
tion and resources.
6 F. DUNN, THE PROTECTION OF NATIONALS 58 (1952).
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confrontations with nations possessing value systems opposed to their
own.
6
The contours of Latin American economic and legal history since in-
dependence were largely shaped by such confrontations. Powerful, indus-
trialized States seeking outlets for surplus people, goods, and capital were
pitted against the weaker politically fragmented and economically disor-
ganized Latin American nations which largely depended upon exports of
mineral and agricultural resources. This was early recognized by the
Latin American themselves. A Venezuelan commentator wrote in 1884:
The origin of the public and private law of the Hispanic American Re-
publics must be sought in the source of the international differences with
foreign powers, which has produced an inequality in the treatment of the
nations of the hemisphere obliging us to establish a special one (law)
which will respond to our aspirations and to the needs of our general
interests.'
The intensity and nature of confrontation has varied with stages of Latin
American political and economic evolution. Thus, the main perceived
threat to sovereignty in Latin America today is no longer a naval block-
ade, but dependence upon foreign technology and the multinational
While all Latin American Nations have contributed to their collective impact on in-
ternational law, some played more obvious roles than others. Mexico, Venezuela and Argen-
tina have provided particularly meaningful contributions through their diplomats and com-
mentators, and through the international confrontations with which they have been
involved. Undoubtedly this preeminence reflects their traditionally close involvement with
foreign investors and their States. Other nations perhaps did not afford such great confron-
tation opportunities due to their relative lack of attraction to alien entrepreneurs.
In the case of Brazil a variety of factors minimised, in the Nineteenth Century at least,
participation in the confrontation process, which made the transition from colony to inde-
pendence possible without the chaos that beset the former Spanish colonies. In fact Brazil
maintained roughly the same type of government well into the Nineteenth Century, because
the Portuguese Royal family fleeing Napoleon, moved to Brazil and planted the roots of
what was to become an independent nation ruled by an Emperor. Also its population, con-
centrated on the coast, gave it a demographic unity which belied its great size and con-
trasted sharply with the Spanish colonies where geographical barriers divided the new na-
tions and encouraged a chaotic devisive regionalism. See text C. Atkins, LATIN AMERIcA IN
THE INTERNATIONAL PoLrricAL SYSTEM 279-280 (1932).
So in Brazil there was no abrupt break with the colonial past and no long struggle
for control of the instruments of government. From the beginning of independence
the country possessed trained administrators, and it was peculiarly happy in the
character of its second emperor, Pedro II, who governed constitutionally and
wisely, until 1889 the monarchy withered away and the republican era began.
See G. PENDLE, A HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA 124 (1973). Consequently remarks later in this
essay referring to post-independence turbulence apply more accurately to Spanish Latin
America than to Brazil. There is good reason to consider a separate study of Brazil's impact
on international law.
7R. SEIJAS, 1 EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL HISPANO AMERICANO 509 (1884).
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corporation.
This theme of confrontation still endures as the principle molding
force behind Latin American attitudes towards international law. It is
helpful, therefore, to approach an inquiry into Latin America's impact on
international law through a chronological review of the different stages of
the continent's historical, political, and economic development.'
III. THE COLONIAL YEARS: 1492-1824
A. Indians and Theologians
During the colonial period any direct Latin American impact upon
international law was minimal. Colonial policy required the different
Vice-Royalties and Captain Generalcies to report exclusively to Spain.
They were actively discouraged from trading with each other, let alone
with foreign nations, and were closely interwoven into a complex adminis-
trative system centered in Europe.
The discovery of the New World with its exotic, numerous Indian
population caused a reexamination in Spain of the underlying assump-
tions of prevailing international law. First, there was the question of the
validity of Spain's title to the New World, which "exercised some of the
best minds of the Sixteenth Century."' Second, the issue of political
rights for the Indians forced great debate. To sixteenth century Europe-
ans, the Indians with their complex, barbaric and often well-developed
civilizations must have appeared strange and rare. In 1493, however, Pope
Alexander VI instructed the Crown of Castile to convert the Indians to
Christianity. This commission raised a new variety of issues: Could the
Indians be converted by force? Could the duty of conversion justify
armed conquest and the overthrow of their rulers? What legal and politi-
cal rights should they have? Could they be forced to work or be
enslaved?o10
' Law does not develop in a vaccum, but in response to conflicting economic, social and
political pressures. Unless an interdisciplinary approach involving politics, economics, soci-
ology and history is applied to the study of Latin American legal development, the student
will be misled by the apparent similarity of Latin American institutions to those of Civil
Law European nations. This similarity is deceptive, and assumptions applicable to Europe
are of limited validity in Latin America. The role of law in Latin America is different from
its role in the United States or in Western Europe. While it might be possible to understand
the workings of the French legal system by reading books, this would not be possible re-
specting Latin America, where the social structures are quite different from those of Europe.
See Karst, The Study of Latin American Law and Legal Institutions, in SOCIAL SCIENCE
RESEARCH IN LATIN AMERICA 291-92 (C. Wagley ed.1964). See also Cooper and Furnish,
Latin America: A Challenge to the Common Lawyer, 21 J. LEGAL EDUC. 435 (1969).
'J. PARRY, THE SPANISH SEABORNP EMPIRE 139 (1966).
I d. The Portuguese settlers in Brazil had no such problem, because they encountered
no numerous aboriginal population with well-developed cultures. Instead, the Portuguese
Vol. 13:37
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In seeking answers to these and related questions, two Spanish theo-
logians, the Dominican jurist Francisco de Vitoria (1480-1546) and the
Jesuit Francisco Suarez (1548-1617) revised traditional theories concern-
ing the legitimacy of state conduct. They laid the basis for a new code of
international practice posited upon a natural law determined by the exer-
cise of right reason. "Suarez perceived of law as a moral system, grounded
on eternal law. Eternal law is known to us through natural law, which in
turn is known by the dictates of right reason. To be law, human law must
accord with truths. In other words, to be a law a rule must be moral and
just."" Thus it was implied that people exercising "right reason" could
decide for themselves if a law was just or unjust. Suarez further main-
tained that people could justifiably overthrow a tyrannical government.
After independence this proposition certainly provided further justifica-
tion for political instability and disregard for law."
Vitoria argued in favor of a natural law to govern international rela-
tions. He was among the first legal scholars to reject "all claim of Pope or
Emperor to exercise temporal jurisdiction over other princes, Christian or
infidel,""3 which meant the Pope could not authorize war or conquest in
the New World. Vitoria's concept of a natural law was binding not only
on civilized nations, but also upon those still in a state of nature. But a
just war could only be fought against the Indians "if they denied to other
peoples those rights to which, by the Law of Nations, all peoples were
entitled."" If the Indians merely rejected conversion, they would not
merit conquest. But if they refused to hear the Gospel, refused to admit
strangers, or attacked traders or missionaries without reason, the
Spaniards could be entitled to wage war on them. In the end Suarez re-
luctantly justified Spain's presence in the Indies positing that since
Europeans were the custodians of Natural Law they had a "duty to exer-
cise a paternal and benevolent guardianship over peoples living in igno-
rance or open defiance of Natural Law," such as the Indians, who prac-
ticed human sacrifice, bestiality and other "offences" against Natural
Law."5
found only extremely primitive nomadic forest-living tribes not sufficiently numerous to
provide a sufficient work force. The result was the introduction of African Slavery to sup-
port the sugar economy, with 500,000 West Africans shipped to Brazil in the Seventeenth
Century, see S. STEIN & B. STEIN, THE COLONIAL HERITAGE OF LATIN AMERICA 41-42 (1970).
1" K. KARST & K. ROSENN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: A CASE BOOK 59
(1975).
1 Id.
13 J. PARRY, supra note 9, at 139-40.
14 Id. at 140.
15 Id. at 14, Vitoria's anxious conscious-searching and obvious liberality of mind (for
those days) embarassed the government and drew an official reprimand. Id. at 142. The
Dominican Bartolome de las Casas excoriated Spaniards for their treatment of the Indians,
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Vitoria and Suarez broke new legal ground by formulating this origi-
nal Law of Nations based upon a Natural Law of rights and obligations
applying to all men everywhere.16 More importantly the concept of law
flowing from justice and morality survived in Latin American juridical
thought, if only as a faint strand, throughout decades of legal hair-split-
ting, political instability, and discarded constitutions. The idealistic heri-
tage of Vitoria and Suarez still influences the thought processes of Latin
American judges on the International Court of Justice who "attribute to
it their unique awareness of keeping international law in stride with con-
temporary developments in international society. '17
A 1954 survey of the philosophical bases of the writings of 36 Latin
American legal scholars of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries found
that the Vitoria-Suarez influence is still vigorous after several centuries. 6
The survey also found that while the scholars all combined both positivis-
tic and naturalistic" elements in their philosophies, the emphasis on nat-
uralism, while less pronounced today than in the nineteenth century, is
still quite marked. The author concluded, "There seems to be less adher-
ence in Latin America to rigid positivism than elsewhere. This is true in
the sense that moral influences while relegated to lesser roles more often
than not in Hispanic America are nevertheless rather consistently recog-
nized as having at least some legal validity. '20
The reaction of the Mexican Government in the 1930's to the U.S.
demands for prompt, adequate, and effective compensation for the expro-
priation of oil and agrarian properties again suggests that a theory of law
based upon values other than those related to capitalism and private
property retains its appeal in Latin America. The Mexicans argued that
"on the one hand there are weighed the claims of justice and the im-
provement of a whole people, and on the other hand, the purely pecuni-
and his efforts did lead to a few short-lived reforms, see L. HANKE, THE SPANISH SEARCH FOR
JUSTICE IN THE CONQUEST OF AMERICA (1944). See also ARISTOTLE AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN
(1959).
" Professor Brierly wrote that "Vitoria's teaching marks an important expansion of
international law into a world system," see J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 32 (6th ed.
1963).
" Leonard, Regional Particularism: The Views of the Latin American Judges on the
International Court of Justice, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 674 (1968).
is H. JACOBINI, A STUDY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AS SEEN IN THE
WORKS OF.LATIN AMERICAN WRITERS (1954).
'9 Positivistic writers were those showing a marked preference for treaties, customs and
court decisions as sources of international law. Naturalistic writers viewed international law
"as resting primarily on a sense of what is just and right and only to a small degree on
positive sources. Many of these writers suggest ... that the positive ... order to be valid
must mirror the natural law." Id. at 137-38.
" Id. at 141.
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ary interests of some individuals'. 1 Remnants of the Vitoria-Suarez phi-
losophy are also discernable in attempts of Latin American participants
in regional and international organizations to alter established patterns of
international political and economic conduct by invoking a higher moral-
ity. The Latin American campaign, together with the efforts of third
world states to move North-South development issues into the General
Assembly of the United Nations in order to reform the international
monetary system is the most recent example"' of the continuing Vitoria-
Suarez influence.
B. The Heritage of Misrule
The dead hand of colonial Hapsburg and Bourbon absolutism and
misgovernment still affects Latin America. In post-independence years
this legacy helped perpetuate a political and economic chaos which inevi-
tably led at best to foreign diplomatic protest and at worst to armed in-
tervention. The attitudes toward law and authority formed during the co-
lonial years still condition Latin American legal perceptions and
responses. Although the debilitating colonial heritage has received ample
attention from historians and political scientists,"3 its legal implications
are not always appreciated. 4 Those portions of the colonial heritage
which helped precipitate post-independence confrontation may be viewed
from both economic and political aspects.
Spain's colonial administrative system was authoritarian and highly
stratified. The colonies belonged directly to the Crown. All lines of au-
thority emanated from the King who governed his extensive New World
realm through the Council of the Indies, a body of legally-trained profes-
sional administrators. It was the Council which not only recommended
colonial officials for Royal appointment, but prepared all laws and decrees
relating to the administration, taxation, governance, and supervision of
the colonies. As a result, ". . . no important local scheme of government
or of colonial expenditure might be put into operation by American offi-
" 1938 FOREIGN REL. U.S. 680.
The developed nations are still opposed to allowing the General Assembly of the
United Nations access to the levers of control of international monetary institutions. This
was manifest at the latest IMF and World Bank 'meetings. But the real issue is how to
recycle effectively oil funds to have-not Third World nations. The IMF as presently struc-
tured may not be the answer. And enabling the Third World to have a greater voice in IMF
decision-making is contentious because the IMF "is, after all, a lending institution in the
hands of the borrowers." See The Observer (London), Oct. 3, 1980, at 12, col. 5; The Guard-
ian (London), Oct. 4, 1980, at 19, col. 6.
'S J. PARRY, supra note 9, at 360-62; S. STEIN & B. STEIN, supra note 10.
"I K. KARST & K. RoSENN, supra note 11, at 37-44, provide a good introduction to the
student wishing a basic overview of possible current legal implications.
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cials unless first submitted to it for consideration and approval.""
Moreover, unlike in the British North American possessions, no ef-
fective institutions of local government were allowed to evolve. The
Crown remained the sole, centralized symbol of legitimate authority for
three centuries. The fragility of such a system became manifest when in-
dependence was achieved. The colonial administrators who derived au-
thority from the King suddenly could no longer assert any claim to legiti-
macy; the entire political structure collapsed, and the new nations slipped
into anarchy and a prolonged series of civil wars and revolutions."
The failure of constitutional authorities to maintain order led inevi-
tably to constant streams of complaints from states whose citizens had
suffered injury and loss. In a very real sense, the seeds of nineteenth cen-
tury diplomatic and armed intervention were sown not after 1824, but
centuries before.
Colonial economic policy, as administered through the Council of the
Indies and the Seville Merchants' Guild, was constructed upon the prem-
ise that the colonies existed to supply Spain with precious metals and, to
some extent, agricultural products. The eventual crippling and ruinous
effect of this mercantilistic policy upon the Spanish economy is well-doc-
umented.27 This policy discouraged the development of colonial manufac-
turing or trade with foreign nations and forced upon the New World an
economic dependence upon Europe for manufactured goods, capital, and
technology. Following independence the new nations sought to compen-
sate for years of economic underprivilege by encouraging foreign immigra-
tion and investment. Unfortunately, local political and social institutions,
also grievously underdeveloped, could not afford the protection and se-
curity expected by states whose citizens came to Latin America as inves-
tors, merchants, and engineers after 1824.
The enormous distances between the colonies and Spain, the length
of time required for the voyage, and the clumsy, unwieldy apparatus by
which the Crown sought to govern its New World possessions led to de-
lays in decision-making and bureacratic confusion. By a multiplicity of
devices, the colonists sought to evade laws and regulations which they
considered ill-suited to the realities of colonial life. For example, restric-
tive Spanish commercial policy forbade trade with other nations. This
prohibition, when combined with limits on the number of Spanish ships
" Id. at 37.
2 In some respects the post-independence years may be viewed as a futile search for a
symbol of legitimate authority with which to replace the Spanish crown, See F. TANNEN-
BAUM, TEN KEYS TO LATIN AMERICA (1962); Dawson, International Law National Tribunals
and the Rights of Aliens: The Latin American Experience, 21 VAND. L. REv. 712, 712 n.2.
(1968).
'7 J. PARRY, supra note 9, at 229-250.
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permitted to sail to America, created an artificial scarcity of goods. Con-
sequently, high prices for imports were charged by the merchant monopo-
lies of Seville and Cadiz and their correspondents in Mexico City and
Lima.2" A contraband trade between the colonists and the English and
Dutch was a natural result, involving and corrupting colonial officials on
all levels. The difficulty the Crown experienced in enforcing laws against
contraband was repeated in the fruitless legal attempts to protect the In-
dian population from colonial rapacity, as well as in countless other situa-
tions.2" Obedezco pero no cumplo - "I obey the law but do not execute it"
- were the watchwords of colonial administrators. The disrespect for the
law fostered in colonial times persists today, as indicated by the half-
serious remark still heard in Latin America - "For my friends anything
• . . for my enemies the law."' 0 Such prevalent attitudes made it inevita-
ble that after independence conflicts would arise with foreign entrepren-
eurs and contractors.
IV. THE DEFENSIVE YEARS: 1824-1910
A. Attracting Investment
During the first 50 years after independence Latin American states
were preoccupied with replacing the discredited colonial apparatus with
new governmental and legal structures which could protect their political
and territorial sovereignty from external aggression.
Shielding economic interests from foreign penetration was of secon-
dary concern to the nation-builders. Indeed, foreign loans, investment,
and immigration were eagerly sought by the new states. To encourage
alien interest, the new constitutions promised foreigners equality of treat-
2 S. STEIN & B. STEIN, supra note 10, at 47-50.
'9 Laws drafted in Spain to prevent Indian slavery, forced labor and related abuses,
such as the New Laws of 1542, encountered great opposition from the colonists whose way
of life depended upon the labor and tribute of the Indians, and who devised ingenious ways
to circumvent protective legislation, see Dawson, Labor Legislation and Social Integration
in Guatemala, 1871-1944: 14 AM. J. COMP. L. 124, 124 n.3 (1964). For a detailed discussion
of the humanitarian legislation and the means the colonist used to avoid enforcing it, see
Sherman, Indian Slavery and the Cerrato Reforms, 51 Hisp. AM. HIsT. REv. 25 (1971).
go K. KARST & K. ROSENN, supra note 11, at 60. Colonial Brazil until 1808, when the
Portuguese royal family sailed to Brazil escorted by British warships, was governed through
the Overseas Council, an organization every bit as inefficient as its Spanish counterpart. Id.
at 38. The Brazilians devised their own method of avoiding unpalatable legal restrictions
decreed by the irresponsive Council. Known as the jeito or "fix," it remains an integral part
of Brazilian life today, see Rosenn, The Jeito: Brazil's Institutional Bypass Of The Formal
Legal System And Its Developmental Implications, 19 AM. J. CoMP. L. 514 (1971) But the
colonial rule "had been relatively light and cohabitation with negroes in a tropical country
had produced a people of easy-going disposition," so the colony avoided the bitter tensions
and race conflicts which had beset the Spanish colonies, see G. PENDLE, supra note 6, at 120.
1981'
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ment with nationals, which was quite progressive considering the hostility
accorded aliens by the Spanish colonial administration. 1 This strategy of
encouragement initially met with great success, especially in England. Be-
tween 1824-25, British investors placed over £17,000,000 in Latin Ameri-
can government bonds. In the same period at least 46 joint stock compa-
nies with a total capitalization of £35,000,000 were formed in England to
carry out operations in Latin America."2 Mining engineers from Birming-
ham and New York flocked to the newly liberated states and colonization
companies began negotiations with various Latin American governments.
Unfortunately, it was soon apparent that despite the good intentions of
the new states, enthusiasm alone was insufficient to remedy the inability
of their political, economic and social infrastructures to generate suffi-
cient income or internal security to satisfy European expectations.
B. Diplomatic Intervention and State Responsibility.
By 1833 every Latin American bond issue was in default and most of
the foreign companies established to conduct business in the area had
collapsed. 8 Ambitious early attempts to impose a new unity and identity
upon the diverse governments, such as the 1826 Panama Conference, also
failed. Bolivar's Gran Colombia dissolved into its component countries of
Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador, while to the north, Mexico was rent
by civil war following the overthrow of Iturbide's short-lived empire. The
United Provinces of Central America, founded in 1823, were a disparate
group of quarreling nations by 1838.1"
In the succeeding years of confusion and peril, foreigners as well as
nationals were exposed to injury and loss. Indeed, in 1824 when English
Foreign Secretary Geroge Canning recommended recognition of the new
states, he foresaw the need to be in a position to provide diplomatic pro-
tection for British lives and property. He emphasized that " . . . more
and more British capital was daily being sunk in mining and territorial
enterprises in Mexico. This was money that would take time to mature,
and during this time it was inevitable that troubles would arise which
would require the diplomatic intervention of the British Government." 5
3' For accounts of early European colonization attempts in Central America, see W.
GRIFFITH, EMPIRES IN THE WILDERNESS (1975); see H. BANCROFT, 2 HISTORY OF CENTRAL
AMERICA 588-94 (1887). English, Belgian, French and Germans were offered large grants,
citizenship, exemption from military service, and protection of their lives and property as
inducements to settle. H. BANCROFT, Id.
j. RiPPY, BRITISH INVESTMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA 1822-1949, at 17 (1959).
Id. at 18.
For an overview of the turbulent history of the time, see H. BANCROFT, supra note 31;
G. PENDLE, supra note 6, at 84-150; H. HARING, A HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA (1955); J.
RIPPY, LATIN AMERICA (1958).
36 D. PLATT, FINANCE, TRADE AND POLITICS IN BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 313 (1968).
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As Canning had expected, complaints of injury and mistreatment coupled
with requests for assistance soon began flowing in steady streams to the
Foreign Office and to local British legations. The U.S. State Department
had a similar experience.
Unfortunately for the Latin Americans the legal expectations of the
foreign investor and entrepreneur had been based upon a relatively ho-
mogenous and politically stable European experience. Their concepts of
justice and fair dealing "derived their content from the capitalistic indi-
vidualism prevalent in Europe in the early part of the Nineteenth Cen-
tury. They particularly embraced the notions of individual liberty, of the
sacredness of private property even as against the actions of governments,
and the sanctity of contracts."' Although Latin American nations in
their newly-adopted constitutions and related legislation had embraced
these theories and concepts as their own, the young paper institutions
could not overcome the debilitating realities imposed by a harsh, divisive
geography and the residue of colonial underdevelopment.
The inability of governmental and judicial institutions to protect life
and property inevitably led to appeals by injured foreigners to their gov-
ernments for either diplomatic interposition or the use of armed force to
redress injuries. Diplomatic protection, which at first had been based
upon comity, eventually became an institutionalized legal technique justi-
fied by appeals to treaties, state practice, 7 and to authors such as Vattel
whose writings were interpreted to mean that a state which injured an
alien also injured his state."
Without doubt there were abuses of diplomatic intervention, as
claims were exaggerated and utilized in some instances to justify armed
intervention." Nevertheless, recent scholarship strongly suggests that,
" F. DUNN, supra note 5, at 54.
3" Id. at 55.
Id. at 48-52. Conversely the Latin Americans have also found support in Vattel for
the limitation of diplomatic protection, especially in a passage where he states" . . . a sov-
ereign should not interfere in the suits of his subjects in foreign countries nor grant them his
protection except in cases where justice has been denied or the decision is clearly and impal-
pably unjust, or the proper procedure has not been observed, or finally cases where his
subjects, or foreigners in general have been discriminated against. . . ", E. VATTEL, 7 THE
LAW OF NATIONS, 139 (C. Fenwick trans. 1916). Professor Dunn observes that at the time
Vattel was writing in the Eighteenth Century".. . foreign property offered few problems in
national or international affairs. He viewed the State primarily in terms of personal sover-
eignty rather than of territorial jurisdiction. His personification of the State as an organic
unity made up of the sovereign and his subjects. . . . undoubtedly served a useful purpose
in the juristic evolution of the modern state, but it is not easy to apply to the modern world
of extensive international trade and intercourse. . . ." F. DUNN, supra note 5, at 52. The
relevance of theories based directly upon Vattel's writings to the wrenching changes being
undergone by the world community today is extremely dubious.
39 "There seems little doubt that the great powers in their ready resort to ultimatums
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Latin American folklore notwithstanding, the British and American gov-
ernments generally were reluctant to expouse their nationals' claims, es-
pecially those arising from defaulted bond issues or relating to trade and
finance.'0 An English commentator observed that of 40 examples of En-
glish coercion or armed intervention in Latin America between 1820 and
1914, 10 were concerned with insults to the flag, with insults to British
consuls or with unsettled claims; 14 to enforce the claims of British sub-
jects for "outrage and injury;" 12 to restore order and protect property; 3
to safeguard nations under British protection; and 1 to occupy an unin-
habited Atlantic island for a telegraph station. These interventions were
designed to rectify damage already done, and not to force British trade
upon Latin America or to cause any change of government which might
have been more favorable to British entrepreneurs.' 1
The degree of intervention after espousal was quite varied, ranging
from formal protests and withdrawal of diplomatic representation to
blockades, threats of naval bombardment and, eventually, warlike action.
Most claims, however, probably never went beyond the stage of consular
good offices. The extistence of the varied techniques of diplomatic inter-
position not only encouraged conforming behavior but provided a struc-
ture, however imperfect, within which negotiators could seek reasonable
solutions. Frederick Dunn observed that the Latin Americans were proba-
bly better off with the institution of diplomatic protection than without
it. "There is no reason at all to believe that, in the absence of the institu-
tion, the stronger states would have been content to stand by and do
nothing while their citizens in Latin American countries were receiving
treatment which appeared unjust or improper. . . . [I]n other parts of
the world, territorial conquest was then taking place on much slighter
provocation than was being offered in some Latin American countries."''
C. The Latin American Challenge to Diplomatic Protection.
Not all Latin Americans agreed that diplomatic interposition and the
developing law of state responsibility were beneficial. Although late nine-
teenth century leaders such as Mexico's Porfirio Diaz,Venezuela's Guz-
mAn Blanco, Guatemala's Justo Rufino Barrios and Argentina's Domingo
Sarmiento and Bartolom6 Mitre encouraged foreign trade, investment
and threats of the use of force to exact the payment of pecuniary claims, particularly in
Latin America, have often abused their rights and have inflicted gross injustice upon weak
States." E. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD 447, (1915). See
also, Hershy, The Calvo and Drago Doctrines, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 26, 44 (1907).
'1 D. PLATT, supra note 35, at 312; F. DAWSON & I. HEAD, INTERNATIONAL LAW, NA-
TIONAL TRIBUNALS AND THE RIGHTS OF ALIENS 11-12 (1971).
11 D. PLATT, supra note 35, at 330.
42 F. DUNN, supra note 5, at 57.
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and participation in railways, mines, waterworks, ports and agriculture,43
there was concern that foreigners were obtaining advantages through
abuse of the concept of diplomatic protection.""
Leading the attack was the eminent Argentine diplomat and scholar,
Carlos Calvo. Calvo reinterpreted the national or equal treatment doc-
trine which promised aliens equality with nationals, to mean that foreign-
ers merited no better treatment than nationals. As formulated in his pub-
lications and correspondence between 1868 and 1896,45 the Calvo
Doctrine advocated that first, sovereign states, being internationally equal
and independent, enjoy the right to absolute freedom from interference
by other states, either through force or diplomacy; and second, while
aliens should be accorded equal treatment with nationals, they are not
entitled to rights and privileges not accorded to nationals and must seek
redress exclusively in local courts. Therefore aliens could not appeal to
their states for diplomatic intervention except in the event of a narrowly-
defined denial of justice.46
Although claims by aliens were usually for compensation arising out
of injuries to persons or property, Calvo viewed them as potential politi-
cal menaces. He feared that diplomatic intervention could lead to physi-
cal occupation of Latin American territory. This concern of Calvo and his
contemporaries of the possible danger to political independence proved
not to be misplaced. In 1862 Napoleon III, ostensibly in response to de-
faults on bond issues which French citizens had purchased, invaded Mex-
ico where he maintained a puppet emperor until 1867. From 1861 to 1865
Spain held Santo Domingo and fought a war with Peru in 1862-66. The
11 G. PENDLE, supra note 6, at 128-49, 161-70; J. Rippy, supra note 32, at 208.
" The benefits derived from foreign investments and immigration were not denied; but
it was feared that the support given by foreign governments would raise aliens to privileged
positions and lead to foreign domination. Meanwhile, the Nineteenth Century autocrats and
dictators welcomed foreign investment "for personal or patriotic reasons or both. Foreign
capital could mean the sinews of political power, the accumulation of private fortunes, or
the means of accelerating the development of natural resources and public services and of
acquiring more of the amenities and conveniences of civilized life." J. Rippy, supra note 32,
at 210.
4' Although it first appeared in Spanish in 1868 the six volume Le Droit Internationale
Teorique at Pratique was printed in French in final form in Paris in 1896. Still the best
publication on Calvo is D. SHEA, THE CALVO CLAUSE (1955).
46 Calvo thereby rejected the existence of an international minimum standard of jus-
tice. For discussion, see F. DAwsoN & I. HEAD, supra note 40, at 20-22. Another American
commentator writing in 1906 agreed with Calvo that it would be improper for an aggrieved
alien to bypass the local legal system and request diplomatic intervention where the laws of
the host State did not "conflict with the law of nations ... But where ... the courts are
notoriously under the control of an unprincipled dictator, so that an appeal to them would
be a mockery and a sham, it would indeed be a perversion of justice for an alien to be
confined to his remedy in them even though the citizen of the country should have no
other." See Boardwell, Calvo and the "Calvo Doctrine," 18 GREEN BAG, 377, 380 (1906).
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English seized the Falkland Islands and maintained a loose protectorate
over the Mosquito Coast of Honduras and Nicaragua until 1860 and by
1853 the United States had taken over half of Mexico's territory, and had
intervened in Central America where it bombarded one of Nicaragua's
Caribbean ports.
7
Calvo also argued further that European nations applied a double
standard of international morality and responsibility. They only inter-
vened in each other's affairs when there was at stake:
Some important principle of internal politics, such as the balance of
power, or upon some great moral or religious interest favourable to the
development of civilisation; while in the New World the interventions of
European States have rested upon no legitimate principles, being based
upon mere force and a failure to recognise the complete freedom and
independence of American States."'
Calvo's rejection of this double standard found early and sympathetic
support in the writings of Edwin M. Borchard, who in 1915 commented
that "the principles they [Latin America] have adopted in their munici-
pal legislation to forestall diplomatic interposition are such as the exploit-
ing nations, for the larger part the countries of Europe, admit, by com-
mon international practice in their relations among themselves."
Professor Borchard was less sanguine than later commentators when
discussing the positive benefits of diplomatic interposition:
As the European nations ... have the necessary warships to enforce de-
mands, just and unjust, and have no intention, apparently, of changing
their attitude, the weaker Latin-American countries, who alone have re-
sorted to legislative limitations, have gained very little, if anything, by
the enactment of legislative provisions limiting the diplomatic protection
of foreigners.50
Other non-Latin American commentators were less supportive. Amos
S. Hershey, for example, writing in 1907, thought the Calvo Doctrine was
"essentially sound in principle and expedient as policy" but went "too far
in condemning diplomatic interposition or the presentation of claims for
indemnity in all cases" without exceptions such as denials of justice.51
Other non-Latin American lawyers in the United States and Europe fol-
lowed Hershey's view, and the prevailing opinion came to espouse arbitra:
tion rather than intervention as a means of settling disputes. Typical of
, See generally sources cited 34 supra note; E. SQJIER, APuNTAMIENTOS SOERE CENTRO
AMERICA (1856); HONDURAS, DESCRIPTIVE HISTORICAL AND STATISTICAL (1870).
8 Hershey, supra note 39, at 27.
49 E. BORCHARD, supra note 39, at 857-58.
50 Id. at 859.
" Hershey, supra note 39, at 43.
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the non-Latin American views was that "although the acceptance of the
Calvo Doctrine would eliminate the abuses of diplomatic protection, it
would also eliminate the institution itself without substituting an accept-
able alternative.
52
Calvo's reception in Latin America was much more enthusiastic. Al-
though attempts to include the principles of his doctrine in treaties with
European nations failed, such principles were incorporated into agree-
ments among the Latin American states. As a result, Calvo's principles
achieved at least regional international status. But the validity of Calvo
provisions in constitutions and domestic legislation has been rejected by
claimant nations on the theory that unilateral domestic legal prescrip-
tions cannot have international effect. Furthermore, even where Calvo
Doctrine incorporation into national law permits diplomatic interposition
in cases of denial of justice, the intent to interpret the content of denial
of justice solely by narrow municipal standards has led to protests by
non-Latin American states adhering to the minimum standard of
justice.6s
The insertion of a "Calvo Clause" in contracts between a State and
an alien has, at least since 1926, achieved partial international acceptance
on the theory that the voluntary waiver of diplomatic protection is bind-
ing upon the individual, although it may be invalid vis-a-vis his state." In
this context the United States views such a waiver as a factor to be con-
sidered when espousing a claim and as a matter of policy has long re-
frained from diplomatic intervention in cases involving contractual dis-
putes absent a gross denial of justice."8
Calvo's contribution to Latin American and international jurispru-
dence has been extraordinarily lasting. Today, the non-intervention con-
cept is a cornerstone of hemispheric foreign policy which the United
States and the Latin Americans generally observe. It is also a basic ele-
ment in the Charter of the United Nations." Calvo's insistence upon re-
course by aliens to local tribunals also led to constitutional enactments
and other legislation in Latin America as early as 1888. These enactments
made municipal courts a compulsory first stop for aliens with claims
against their host state, and thereby codified and strengthened the ex-
haustion of local remedies rule, a doctrine of customary international
law5" to which the United States has always adhered. s Finally, in 1961
:0 D. SHEA, supra note 45, at 20.
3 Id. at 21-27.
Id. at 194-257.
68 F. DAWSON & I. HEAD, supra note 40, at 175. See also, Hershey, supra note 39, at 39-
40.
" See discussion, infra at.
57 See Trindade, Origin and Historical Development of the Rule of Exhaustion of Lo-
cal Remedies in International Law, 12 REv. BELGE DE DROIT INT'L. 499 (1976).
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the Organization of American States (OAS) Inter-American Juridical
Committee announced that all diplomatic claims were subject to the re-
quirement of prior exhaustion of local remedies, a principle which "is not
merely procedural but substantive"5' in the Western Hemisphere.
Calvo was aided in the struggle against diplomatic protection and in-
trevention by other prominent contemporaries including the Venezuelan
commentator and jurist, Ricardo F. Seijas and his fellow Latin American,
Argentine Luis M. Drago. In 1884 Seijas published his four volume El
Derecho Internacional Hispano Americano, which collected and explored
the basic legal principles binding the Latin American States. He asserted
that "one of the most consistently suffered abuses by foreign powers in
the Central and South American territory is, without doubt, the principle
of diplomatic intervention in favor of their nationals for any motive or
pretext. . . "and, therefore, appeal for diplomatic interposition by aliens
should occur only after the exhaustion of local remedies and a serious
denial of justice." Moreover, foreigners should be permitted to seek in-
demnification from the host government for loss or injury in wartime only
in those cases where nationals are given the same right.61
Drago's contribution to the attack on the perceived privileges en-
joyed by aliens was more dramatic, springing from concern over the En-
glish, German and Italian attempt in 1902 to force Venezuela to agree to
the repayment of its defaulted foreign debt. Professor Platt argues that
English policy-makers consistently refused to espouse claims relating to
unpaid bonds, and that the initial reason Great Britain agreed to a joint
intervention in Venezuela was to obtain redress for injuries to English
ships and subjects. The bond holders did not, he maintains, present their
claims to the Government until after the decision to intervene had been
taken.62
Drago, Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote the Argentine
Minister in Washington that he feared the use of force to collect loans
would set a dangerous precedent. Drago reasoned that collection would
require territorial occupation to be effective and that under the guise of
such financial intervention European nations might seek to reestablish
58 See F. DAWSON & I. HEAD, supra note 40, at 18-20, 50-56.
59 Trindade, supra note 57, at 523.
60 R. SEIJAS, supra note 7, at 77.
1 Id.
02 D. PLATT, supra note 35, at 312, 340-41. Amos Hershey, discussing the Venezuelan
intervention and the use of force to collect contract debts implied that the British restraint
in such matters was based on "motives of policy or expediency," while "[t]he United States
appears to have been restrained, to a certain extent at last, by principle and by a regard for
what it believed to be the law of nations." See Hershey, supra note 39, at 40. See also M.
HOOD, GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY 1895-1905: GREAT POWER PRESSURE IN VENEZUELA (1975).
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colonies in the New World." Drago's concern was understandable since
this was a period when Latin American nations were borrowing actively
on the world's capital market, despite a bad history of defaults and credit
renegotiations. Still fresh was the memory of the 1862 French overthrow
of the Ju~rez government in Mexico which was based in great part on the
flimsy excuse of the notorious Jecker loan." Consequently, Drago sug-
gested that the United States, perhaps as a corollary to the Monroe Doc-
trine, recognize "that the public debt (of an American state) cannot occa-
sion armed intervention, nor even the actual occupation of the territory of
American nations by a European power.""' The Drago letter was circu-
lated in Washington with varying effects. Despite Secretary of State
Hays's indifference, in 1905 President Theodore Roosevelt called Con-
gressional attention to the dangers of allowing foreign nations to collect
debts by armed intervention in the Hemisphere."
Eventually, thoughts inspired by Drago coupled with events in Vene-
zuela led to the controversial Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.
The Corollary permitted the United States to begin preemptive landings
and seizures of customs houses in defaulting Central American and Carib-
bean nations in order to forestall European debt collecting interven-
tions.6 7 This was surely not the type of corollary the Argentine diplomat
had had in mind when he wrote his famous letter.
In 1906, Drago's proposal came before the Third Pan American Con-
" Hershey, supra note 39, at 28-30; E. BORCHARD, supra note 39 at 309. Professor
Borchard also observed ". . . that only a small part of the claims pressed arose out of con-
tractual debts. The primary reason of the blockade was the stubborn reiteration by Vene-
zuela of the exclusive jurisdiction of its national courts and the absolute refusal to arbi-
trate." See E. BORCHARD, supra note 39, at 313 n.1.
" In 1850 a Swiss banker named Jecker prevailed upon a pre-Juarez government to
contract a usurious loan whereby in exchange for Government bonds totalling 15,000,000
Mexican dollars the Mexicans received but 750,000 after deduction of commissions and in-
terest. When Juarez quite rightly refused to honor this obligation, Jecker approached the
Duc de Mornay, Emperor Napoleon III's half-brother, and offered him 30 per cent of the
Mexican bonds for his political support. Jecker then became a naturalized citizen which
enabled the French government, at de Mornay's urging, to espouse his claim, see J. HASLIP
IMPERIAL ADVENTURER: EMPEROR MAXIMILIAN OF MEXICO 145, 174 (1974).
65 E. BORCHARD, supra note 39, at 317; Hershey, supra note 39, at 30.
66 Hershey, supra note 39, at 30-31; E. BORCHARD, supra note 39, at 317.
67 Miriam Hood, now of the Venezuelan Embassy in London, concluded in her percep-
tive study of the blockade, that " . . the importance of the Anglo-German blockade lies in
that it was not until after it took place that the Roosevelt corollary became an integral part
of the American Government's policy on the Caribbean. The blockade was without doubt a
great help in clarifying Roosevelt's ideas." M. HOOD, supra note 62, at 190. Professor
Borchard wrote "international practice seems to have given a sanction to this form of (pre-
emptive) intervention," but" . . . in the absence of an international forum, it is not appar-
ent how grossly exaggerated claims against these states can be avoided ... " E. BORCHARD,
supra note 39, at 326.
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ference in Rio de Janeiro which resolved to request the Second Peace
Conference at the Hague "to examine the question of the compulsory col-
lection of public debts, and, in general, the best means tending to dimin-
ish among nations conflicts of purely pecuniary origins." 8 The Hague
conference, however, decided to treat the matter within the context of
arbitration, which in the years preceding World War I had enjoyed an
exceptional degree of international support as a means of resolving differ-
ences between nations. The resulting Convention, sometimes called the
Porter Proposition after the U.S. representative, rejected resort to armed
force to recover contract debts on the condition that the debtor state did
not refuse to arbitrate, did not obstruct formulation of an agreement after
arbitration was accepted, and did not after arbitration refuse to submit to
the award.6s
The reaction of the Latin American states at the Conference to the
watered-down version of Calvo's original proposal was mixed. Venezuela
refused to sign, maintaining that arbitration should only be allowed after
exhaustion of local remedies and a denial of justice.7 1 Other Latin Ameri-
can nations did sign with reservations similar to those voiced by Drago
himself, that "public loans with bond issues constituting the national
debt cannot in any case give way to military aggression nor to the occupa-
tion of the soil of the American states. 7 1 The rejection of armed force as
a means of debt collection only upon the condition of arbitration is now
of course nullified by the various United Nations resolutions eschewing
the use of armed force and intervention. Thus the contributions of both
Calvo and Drago are at last truly internationalized.
D. The Emergence of a Regional International Law.
It was evident soon after independence that legal institutions inher-
ited from Spain would be of scant assistance in promoting peace, national
unity, and prosperity. The conflicting, confusing mass of Spanish and
Portuguese laws governing commerce, for example, could not be any more
responsive to Latin American problems than could the political machin-
68 Hershey, supra note 39, at 26.
" Scott, Hague Convention Restricting the Use of Force to Recover On Contract
Claims, 2 Am. J. INT'L L. 78, 88 (1907).
70 Id. at 89; E. BORCHARD, supra note 39, at 320.
" E. BORCHARD, supra note 39, at 320. Although Drago must have been disappointed at
the outcome of the Conference " . . . it was largely due to his sympathy with the general
proposition and to his influence upon several of the Latin American delegations in the Sec-
ond Hague Conference that they did not abstain from voting for the Convention." Scott,
supra note 69, at 89. Ironically, the Porter Proposition "acutally sanctions the use of armed
force in a class of cases in which the United States and, on occasion, other powers, have
declined as a matter of policy, to intervene diplomatically." E. BORCHARD, supra note 39, at
321.
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ery of the rejected centralized monarchy respond to Latin American
needs.
Establishing the new legal systems necessitated extensive legislative
borrowing from more politically and legally sophisticated nations. The
undertaking involved the adaptation of constitutions modelled on that of
the United States, and of civil and commercial codes based upon post-
Napoleonic European models, especially the French Civil Code and the
1829 Spanish Commercial Code. As one author commented, "the new Eu-
ropean codifications, packaged in a readily exportable form, provided or-
der to replace chaos and new procedural systems to replace old. 7 2 Only
after post-independence turbulence abated would legislators and legal
technicians be free to attempt codifications and constitutional amend-
ments that might respond more accurately to the fundamental Latin
American realities of political fragility, geographical barriers, illiteracy,
poverty, and poor or non-existent internal communications.7 3
The first steps taken to establish new domestic legal institutions were
paralleled by efforts to establish a wider hemispheric order to buttress
defenses against Spanish attempts to recapture the now-independent col-
onies. Put another way, the new states required a new international legal-
ity in order to survive. From the earliest days of independence, Latin
American states were involved with international law as they sought to
regulate relations among themselves. At first the goals of such leaders as
Sim6n Bolivar were expressed in attempts to establish political unity.
The 1826 Panama Conference, which was promoted by Bolivar,
sought to create a regional political association united by a common resis-
tance to the former colonial power. The resulting treaty of the Union
League and Perpetual Confederation, although ratified only by Greater
Colombia, was the forerunner of a succession of nineteenth century reso-
lutions, treaties, and pacts, most of which were never ratified, but which
7 Means, Codification in Latin America: The Colombian Commercial Code of 1853, 52
TEx. L. REV. 18, 22 (1973). See also Swartz, Codification in Latin America: The Brazilian
Commercial Code of 1850, 10 TEx. INrr'L. L. J. 347 (1975).
78 One commentator suggests that while it is a "truism" that much of the borrowed
constitutions and European Codes ill-suited Latin America, nonetheless "there has been a
great deal of nonsense written about the inappropriateness and the supposed dysfunctional-
ity of the legal-constitutional models adapted by the Latin American nations in the Nine-
teenth Century." The Latin American "founding fathers" did not seek to divorce themselves
from 300 years of colonial history, but sought in their constitutions "to incorporate the re-
publican forms and language of the day while retaining their non-democratic and non-revo-
lutionary heritage almost intact." Wiarda, Law and Political Development in Latin
America: Toward a Framework for Analysis, 19 AM. J. COmP. L. 434, 442-43 (1971). Pursu-
ant to this theory, it was entirely logical to offset the elaborate "bills of rights" in these
early constitutions with provisions for suspending these guaranteed rights, see F. DAWSON &
I. HEAD, supra note 40, at 79-84.
1981
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
expressed a surprising degree of solidarity on basic legal issues .7 After
the collapse of Greater Colombia into civil strife in 1830, Mexico made its
bid for hemispheric leadership by attempting to organize five separate
Latin American congresses between 1831 and 1842. All failed because,
"despite the existence of a common cultural heritage, in political and eco-
nomic matters, Spanish-Mexican unity was the most transparent of
fictions. '7 5 In 1865, Peruvian effort produced a treaty codifying certain
international principles including non-intervention. It was, however,
never ratified by its signatories, Bolivia, Ecuador, Chile and Peru.7
After the 1865 meeting, the Latin American conference underwent a
perceptible change of emphasis, probably due to the influence of Carlos
Calvo's writings.7 Ambitious earlier efforts at seeking protection from the
outside world by a political union were replaced by a reliance upon inter-
national law to shield the states from external assaults upon their sover-
eignty. Conferences, such as the Congress of Jurists which met in Lima
between 1877 and 1879 and the 1883 Bolivarian Conferences in Caracass7
sought to enshrine and codify principles of international public and pri-
vate law. Latin American views on non-intervention, the rights and duties
of states, territorial jurisdiction, diplomatic asylum, maritime jurisdiction,
state responsibility, and arbitration 7 were all principles which the states
7, C. ATKINS, supra note 6, at 278. See also J. LocKEY, PAN AMERICANISM: ITS BEGIN-
NINGS 312-354 (1920). "But the Panama Conference was not a total loss for it brought out
the importance of some kind of Hispanic or Latin American Union, and was to be followed
in the nineteenth century by a series of hemispheric conferences that were to result finally
in the Organization of American States." H. DAVIS, J. FINN & F. PECK, LATIN AMERICAN
DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 74 (1977). A Colombian commentator called the Panama Treaties:
"One of the principle sources of American International Law." H. DAVIS, J. FINN & F. PECK,
Id.
'7 C. ATKINS, supra note 6, at 278. A. WHITAKER, THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE IDEA 50
(1954).
76 C. ATKINS, supra note 6, at 278-79; H. JACOBINI, supra note 18, at 122-23.
77 Little is yet know of the exact extent of Calvo's influence. The general impact of his
thinking is admitted, but further research might reveal the identity of his disciples, and,
more importantly, perhaps of the jurists who had initially inspired him.
76 C. ATKINS, supra note 6, at 280-81.
71 Leonhard, supra note 17, at 676. One of the most significant of the pre-World War I
meetings was the first Pan American Conference held in Washington, D.C. in 1889-90, where
the basic divergence of interests between Latin American and the United States was first
highlighted in an international setting. The Latin American States rejected U.S. proposals
for a compulsory arbitration system which they suspected the U.S. might dominate. Simi-
larly, they turned down the U.S. concept of a hemispheric customs union which would, they
feared, harm relations with their European trading partners and tie them to the U.S. On the
other hand, the U.S. delegation opposed Latin American views "that there existed an Amer-
ican international law that differed on a number of vital points from international law,"
especially with regard to the right of diplomatic intervention to protect nationals. The U.S.
spokesman argued that "there can no more be an American international law than there can
be an English, a German or a Prussian international law." Instead, international law was the
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sought to codify.
Through these conferences the Latin American nations began to as-
sume a distinct, collective identity. They created a special legal system or
suborder, with legal institutions within, yet in some aspects apart from,
the Europeanized international law propounded by legal theorists in capi-
tal-exporting nations. Supplementing the efforts of Latin American con-
ferences to codify and propound a regional international law were at-
tempts by Latin American jurists to persuade the outside world to
recognize the existence of a so-called American international law, which
in important respects differed from the "universal" international law con-
cepts of the day. Their exhortations should not be dismissed solely as
defensive attempts to assert models of conduct which could relieve Latin
America from onerous, externally-imposed legal obligations.
In 1883 the Argentine jurist Amancio Alacorta in the "Nueva Revista
de Buenos Aires" accused Calvo's treatise on international law of over-
looking the existence of a special American international law that the
Latin American nations observed among themselves. This American view
included precepts such as non-intervention, equality of States and equal
treatment for nationals and aliens. Calvo responded by denying the exis-
tence of an international law peculiar to Latin America since interna-
tional law was by its nature universal. Unconvinced, Alacorta replied that
America required legal solutions different from those developed in
Europe."°
This conceptual battle of the books surfaced again at meetings of the
American Congress of Scholars in Santiago in 1905-08. Chile's Alejandro
0. Alvarez upheld the distict nature of Latin American international law
against the arguments of Brazil's Manuel A. de Souza S. Vianna, who in
1912 published his "De la Non-Existence d'un Droit Internationale Amer-
ican.""1 The esoteric, unreal nature of the debate, and the limited audi-
ence to which it was directed, is suggested by the publication by both
authors of their views in French.
The Alvarez thesis is that a special type of international law devel-
oped in the Americas which combined the Anglo-Saxon legal system in
the United States with the Spanish legal tradition as expressed in the
common law of the civilized world and could only be changed by the consent of all civilized
nations. Under international law there was a universal standard of "substantial justice" to
be observed in the treatment of aliens. By implication, if a State could not or would not
provide such justice, intervention would be justified. See Fontaine, Latin America's New
Internationalism: An Historical Overview, in LATIN AMERICA'S NEw INTERNATIONALISM: THE
END OF HEMISPHERIC ISOLATION 1, 42-46 (R. Fontaine & J. Theberge eds. 1975).
80 Butler, Latin American Approaches to International Law, 6 INT'L J. POL. 1, 130 (ed.
1976).
01 Id. This was written to refute Alvarez's Le Droit International Americain (1910).
The Alvarez viewpoint is explained in detail in H. JACOBINI, supra note 18, at 124-133.
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resolutions and declarations of inter-American conferences. The "rules"
derived by Alvarez from these sources and which purportedly comprise
American international law included (a) recognition of the legal status of
rebels, (b) recognition of political asylum, (c) acceptance of ius soli as
opposed to ius sanguineus, (d) the equality of states, (e) the Drago Doc-
trine, (f) acceptance of codification of international law and (g) arrange-
ments for hemispheric defense.82 In summation, "[B]y American interna-
tional law one ought to understand the aggregate of institutions,
principles, rules, doctrines, conventions, customs, and practices which are
characteristic of the American republics in the domain of international
relations."83
Throughout his long career as a commentator and, later as a Judge
on the Permanent Court of International Justice, Alvarez repeatedly ex-
pressed his belief in a body of jurisprudence sufficiently weighty and co-
herent to be called American international law. His challengers main-
tained that the principles or rules he cited were not necessarily of
exclusively American origin, and that while American legal traditions had
contributed to international legal development, it was inappropriate to
refer to an American international law. The arguments pro and con
prompted one recent commentator to remark "the controversy regarding
the existence or non-existence of an American international law resolves
itself largely into a terminological squabble.""
Although Alvarez and his supporters today are in the minority, they
correctly and early identified a loose type of regional unity. This unity
was expressed in bilateral and multinational agreements among the Latin
American states themselves, and it later fostered a striking degree of legal
unanimity as the states participated in the debates of international bod-
ies, notably those considering the law of state responsibility, the law of
the sea, and the jurisdictional exclusivity of municipal tribunals.
Latin American legal opinion still divides on the significance of this
regional legal consensus, as indicated in a series of essays by Argentine,
Chilean, Ecuadorian, Cuban and Mexican writers published in 1976. Al-
though the editor of the collection took no position in the debate, he pre-
dicted that "in the 1970 - 80's . . . the Latin American heritage promises
to have a broader analytical relevance for the purposes of comparison
with regional approaches to international law elsewhere," including the
European Economic Community (EEC) countries, Socialist nations, Af-
rica and Asia.85 But further inquiry is needed before deciding if a particu-
See, Butler, supra note 80, at 129.
13 A. ALVAREZ, DESPUES DR LA GUERRA 182-83 (1943), quoted in Butler, supra note 80, at
127.
84 Butler, supra note 80, at 133.
85 Butler, supra note 80, at 5.
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lar regional legal system can be classified as anything more than an
aberration:
Among the issues to be contemplated are the various ways in which a
regional international law consciousness emerges; the values or ideas
which it cherishes; the perceived relationship of the regional legal order
to general principles of international law and jus cogens; the extent to
which regional principles of international law are the product of treaties
or of a regional customary international law; the degree to which a re-
gional international legal consciousness emerges from or identifies with
the activities of regions' international institutions .... s
When confronting the outside world in conferences or in the corri-
dors of the United Nations, it is evident that a definite Latin American
solidarity based upon consistently expressed legal doctrines does indeed
exist. The impact of this unity upon the legal order of the past is possible
to assess. The effect upon the future is a matter of concern. The remarks
of one commentator who rejects a separate Latin American international
law are particularly thought-provoking. He suggests that doctrines and
efforts directed towards regional problem-solving are but perhaps reflec-
tions of "the seeming impossibility of achieving a necessary measure of
world-wide cooperation. 8 7 Many problems, though, are regional and lo-
cal, and dealing with them on a world-wide level could magnify their sig-
nificance and pose threats to world peace.88 Given that assumption, per-
haps a regional approach to reform highly controversial areas, such as
human rights, might have better prospects for success than attempts to
achieve universally acceptable and unenforceable declarations.
V: THE TRANSITIONAL YEARS: 1910-1945
A. The Mexican Revolution as Catalyst in the Struggle for Economic
Sovereignty.
The 1910 Mexican Revolution marked a watershed for developing
Latin American law and aspirations. Although physically the conflict was
confined to Mexico, the challenges posed in the 1920's and 1930's to what
was the then accepted law of state responsibility still reverberate
throughout the continent. It was the first time that a Latin American na-
tion had rejected traditional international views on the sanctity of private
property. Mexico interposed an overriding obligation - the right of the
80 Id. at 5. Other relevant considerations might indicate: (a) a common language, (b) a
similar historical background, and (c) the length of time in which States have asserted the
uniqueness of their groupings.
87 Note, International Law in Latin America, 7 LAW. AM. 605, 608 (1975).
8 A similar justification is given in support of the Exhaustion of Local Remedies Rule.
See F. Dawson & I.Head, supra note 40, at 18-20.
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state to control its own economic destiny for the ultimate benefit of its
citizens." This was not the classical palace coup which the international
community had come to expect from Latin America. It was a movement
aimed at promoting the well-being of an entire society,90 and it "soon de-
veloped into a social movement of profound significance." 1
The ideals of the Revolution were synthesised in the Constitution of
1917. The Constitution was the product of Latin America's first genuine
social upheaval, so it differed from the many constitutions that had pre-
ceded it in Mexico and elsewhere in Latin America. It stressed economic
nationalism, state ownership of natural resources, land reform, the state's
right to regulate and take private property in the public interest, and it
"is permeated with a paternalistic concern for the health, welfare and cul-
tural advancement of the poor, the illiterate, and the dispossessed. '""
The U.S. and European reaction to Mexico's expropriations was one
of outrage, characterised by attempts to rebut the challenge by recourse
to nineteenth century precedents in which the courts and tribunals had
dealt with isolated property seizures. These orthodox preferences condi-
tion the legality of the taking of foreign wealth upon "public utility" and
payment of "full" or "prompt adequate and effective compensation in
lieu of restitution."'98 Obviously if such standards were to be applied, no
wide-scale readjustment of social inequities could ever be achieved.
Therefore, while Mexico admitted it was obliged to offer compensation
under international law, it insisted that "the time, amount and manner of
payment could be determined only pursuant to her own laws .... "94
This verbal struggle continued for 20 years, first with respect to lands
expropriated in the 1920's, and then with renewed vigor when foreign oil
properties were seized under President Cardenas in 1938. Ultimately the
Mexican-American Agreement of 1941 settled the agrarian claims, while
claims relating to the expropriation of American and British oil proper-
ties were satisfied respectively in 1942 and 1947. 9'
If there was a "winner" in such a wasteful, lengthy confrontation, it
was surely Mexico, which never deviated from its initial stance. The com-
pensation, when it was agreed, was certainly not "prompt" and was con-
siderably below the value claimed. More importantly, Mexico's successful
challenge to traditional compensation norms undoubtedly established sig-
For a discussion of the Mexican expropriations and the legal postures of the protag-
anists, see Dawson & Weston, "Prompt Adequate and Effective". A Universal Standard of
Compensation?, 30 FORD L. REv. 727, 740-42 (1962).
90 Kunz, The Mexican Expropriations, 17 N.Y.U.L.Q. 327, 328 (1940).
" F. DUNN, supra note 5, at 43.
9 K. KAST, & K. ROSENN, supra note 11, at 44.
13 Dawson & Weston, supra note 89, at 729.
Id. at 740.
Id. at 741.
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nificant precedents which were to be followed after 1945 by revolutions in
Latin America, Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia. The international re-
quirement of "prompt, adequate, and effective" compensation was irre-
trievably eroded by Mexico's steadfastness, precipitating a yet-unfinished
search for new standards of greater relevance in a world of changing val-
ues and increased aspirations." Mexico's attempts to alter traditional le-
gal norms to accommodate a search for a more just society were rooted in
the philosophies of Vitoria and Suarez. Their insistence in the 1920's
upon arrogating exclusively to municipal courts the jurisdiction to deter-
mine the timing and amount of compensation foreshadowed Article 2(2)
of the 1974 Charter of the Rights and Duties of States, which provides
that "where the question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, it
shall be settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing State and by
its tribunals." 7 The attitudes and philosophies of the Mexican advocates
forged during the disputes generated by the Revolution therefore link
Latin America's Iberian past with its present efforts to assume a leader-
ship position in the Third World.
B. The First World War, Internationalism and the Quest for Legal
Certainty
Although Latin America was not involved directly in the conflagra-
tion that exploded in Europe in 1914, the war nevertheless had two
profound effects upon the southern half of the hemisphere. The United
States replaced Germany and eventually England as the prime investor
and trading partner in the area, and the League of Nations provided
Latin American States with novel opportunities to join older, more pow-
erful nations in formulating a new basis for international order.
1. Emergence of the United States as the Focal Point for
Confrontation
Prior to World War I, U.S. investments in Latin America approxi-
mated one billion dollars, of which 82 percent was concentrated in Mexico
and Cuba. British investments, on the other hand, were nearly five billion
dollars following the investment booms of the 1880's and the period be-
tween 1902-19.12. Of the total British investment, 77 percent was concen-
trated in South America, particularly in Argentina."
" The compensatory standards the United States sought to apply were distilled from
State practices relating to isolated takings of alien property. Precedents from these "lim-
ited" deprivations were inapplicable in a social revolution context necessitating "extensive"
foreign wealth deprivations, Id. at 729-32.
G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 50 U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
" Hicks, The Federal Reserve Act of 1913: Fulcrum for United States Expansion in
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The pattern began to reverse after 1913 when Woodrow Wilson be-
came President. Wilson feared that accumulation of industrial surpluses
would create economic stagnation and recession unless exports were in-
creased. Therefore, he and his colleagues began an unremitting campaign
to interest manufacturers in export possibilities, promising governmental
support.9 Before World War I, the United States was third in Latin
American trade and investment after Great Britain and Germany. Anti-
quated banking legislation prohibited American banks from branching
abroad, with the result that any export trade to Latin America had to be
financed through the network of English and German banks already es-
tablished in the area. The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 reversed this pos-
ture and allowed foreign branch banking. It also permitted American
banks to issue and accept bills of exchange, a service which they had been
previously unable to provide. 100
The outbreak of war caused European manufacturers and financiers
to withdraw their attentions, at least temporarily, from Latin America.
American businessmen, encouraged by their government, quickly began
to fill the vacuum. By 1921, the dollar had replaced the pound sterling as
the chief medium of financing Latin American trade, thereby establishing
a dollar-related dependence which still exists. Consequently, 100 Ameri-
can banks were scattered throughout Latin America, and the United
States outstripped Great Britain and Germany as the hemisphere's domi-
nant economic influence. 10' The United States became the principle focus
of Latin American resentments as U.S. hemispheric hegemony increased
after 1945 and British investment waned dramatically. This pattern of
economic dependence led to .furture confrontations and challenges to
older value systems. These challenges, of which the 1959 Cuban Revolu-
tion was to be but one example, are echoed in the efforts of the Andean
Common Market to limit technological dependence upon multinational
corporations..1
2. Attempts to Protect Economic Sovereignty at Conference Tables
and in Courtrooms
By 1921 Latin American alarm at the consequences of U.S. economic
power had been compounded by the retention of the Platt Amendment,
the landing of naval forces at Vera Cruz by President Wilson, and as-
sorted physical interventions in Central America and the Caribbean.
Latin America, 21 WAYNE L. REv. 1373, 1374 (1975); J. Rippy, supra note 32, at 7-12.
" Hicks, supra note 98, at 1377. Wilson appointed a new Secretary of Commerce who
instigated much-needed changes. Id.
100 Id. at 1395 et. seq.
101 Id. at 1374, 1398.
102 See discussion infra, at.
Vol. 13:37
LESSER DEVELOPED NATIONS
Stringent efforts were made at Pan American Conferences to present
a united front against the United States in order to extract a pledge
against future intervention. Partial success was achieved at the 1933 Sev-
enth Pan American conference in Montevideo when the United States
became party to the Convention on Rights and Duties of States which
condemned intervention. In 1936, the United States withdrew its reserva-
tions to the 1933 treaty and non-intervention became the cornerstone of
the inter-American system.1 03
Several Pan American conferences sought to obtain agreement on the
codification of international law, and did achieve some unanimity on the
peaceful settlement of disputes in treaties signed in 1923 and 1933. The
Good Neighbor policy of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the abrogation of the
Platt Amendment established an atmosphere of cooperation which led to
further meetings before and during World War II to agree on collective
security and closer economic and military cooperation. In 1945, the Cha-
pultepec Conference provided for mutual, collective self-defense and an
economic Charter of the Americas. ' " Perhaps the most important result
of these conferences was the reinforcing of the sense of regional solidarity
which had begun to form soon after independence. Thus, Latin America,
controlling 40 percent of the votes, was able at the San Francisco confer-
ence to influence the drafting of the United Nations Charter, especially
those provisions recognizing the right of individual or collective self-de-
fense and the peaceful settlement of disputes.1z"
During the inter-war years, Latin American efforts at regional confer-
ences to strengthen the Pan American system were paralleled by its con-
tributions at the League of Nations. Membership in the League gave new
103 Wilson, Multilateral Policy and the Organization of American States: Latin Ameri-
can-United States Convergence and Divergence, in LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 50 (H.
Davis, L. Wilson eds. 1975). Unilateral diplomacy was also employed. Faced with United
States policy of withholding recognition of new governments as a political weapon, Genaro
Estrada, the Mexican Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in 1930 enunciated the so-called Estrada
Doctrine. Basically it says that Mexico will not as a matter of policy take a formal position
on the question of granting recognition to a new government because this would mean en-
croaching on the sovereignty of other nations, and subject their internal affairs to the ap-
proval or disapproval of other governments. Mexico therefore limits itself to maintaining or
breaking off diplomatic relations without implying approval or disapproval of the new gov-
ernment. The Estrada Doctrine was to be somewhat modified in 1969 when the Mexican
Secretary of State proclaimed the so-called "Thesis of continuity", that is, that the Latin
American nations should keep open channels of communication in revolutionary situations
and Mexico did not wish to break the continuity of its relations with other Latin American
nations whatever the nature and orientation of their governments. Therefore, Mexico main-
tained diplomatic relations with Cuba despite United States efforts to internationalize its
"hard line" approach towards Fidel Castro, see Vazquez, The Subjects of International
Law, in Butler, supra note 80, at 133, 136-37.
:04 Wilson, supra note 103, at 52.
lOs Id.
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status to the Latin American nations. This acceptance of the Latin Amer-
ican nations as significant members of the international community coin-
cided with a profound alteration in international legal thinking.
The international arbitration concepts, which before the war had
seemed to promise the best hope of settling international disputes peace-
fully, were discredited by 1918. As Frederick Dunn wrote in 1932, "The
World War, in the minds of a great many people, represented the break-
down of international law as an effective instrument for regulating and
controlling the relations between nations." 1" After 1918, scholarly atten-
tion turned to codification of existing international legal principles in or-
der "to make rules clear and certain and thereby establish some order of
priorities or guidelines for international conduct."'107
Accordingly, in 1924, the General Assembly of the League resolved
that an expert committee be appointed to study the possibility of codifi-
cation of international law. The committee eventually submitted a report
on several topics which it thought could profitably be discussed for codifi-
cation purposes, including the question of the responsibility of states for
injuries to aliens or their property. The report of J. Gustavo Guerrero, a
Salvadorean, synthesized the Latin American policy preferences of the
equal treatment doctrine, a restrictive view of denials of justice, the
supremacy and finality of municipal court decisions, and a denial of dip-
lomatic intervention. 1"8
At the First Conference for the Codification of International Law in
1930, the Committee designated to prepare a draft convention on state
responsibility was unable even to agree on bases for discussion. The issues
had become polarized between the states primarily interested in perserv-
ing an environment conducive to trade and investment, and those Latin
American states which were no longer willing to sacrifice political and ec-
onomic sovereignty in return for economic participation. The Conference
thus adjourned without adopting a convention on state responsibility.1"
The principles advocated by Guerrero had to wait another 40 years before
attaining at least limited extrahemispheric recognition.
The Latin American struggle to alter prevailing international legal
concepts to reflect their own preferences was manifest during 1910 to
1945 in numerous confrontations before arbitration tribunals. Many of
the cases derived from injuries to persons and property in the years dur-
ing and following the Mexican Revolution of 1910 and were heard before
104 F. DUNN, supra note 5, at 61.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 62.
109 Id. at 63. Guerrero's views of what might constitute a denial of justice sufficiently
grave to justify diplomatic interposition were so narrow that they "restricted the exercise of
diplomatic protection to occasions which seldom if ever arise in practice." Id. at 64.
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the U.S.-Mexican General Claims Commission established in 1923 and
the Special Mexican Claims Commission of 1934. The resulting jurispru-
dence concerning the measure of damages and due diligence on the part
of the host state in prosecuting wrongdoers is extensive. Perhaps the most
significant case decided by an arbitral commission in this area was
United States (Northern American Dredging Company of Texas) v. the
United Mexican States, which reversed prior case law and upheld the
validity of a Calvo clause as a bar to a claim against Mexico for breach of
contract.110 The Commission decided that the Calvo Clause precluded the
claimant from requesting diplomatic protection and required it to seek
redress in local courts. The clause would not, however, bind a claimant's
government from interceding on its own initiative in the event of a viola-
tion of international law, such as denial of justice. Although North Amer-
ican Dredging Co. was followed in five subsequent arbitration deci-
sions,"' Latin Americans either rejected the qualification that a waiver
would not be effective in the event of a denial of justice, or interpreted
the content of a denial of justice by more narrow, municipal standards.'1
Between 1922 and 1939 four judges from Latin America sat on the
Permanent Court of International Justice.'1 Unfortunately the issues
which came before the Court were not of a type to enable these judges to
employ any obviously Latin American preferences or doctrines. It is nev-
ertheless interesting to examine the 1929 dissenting opinion of Judge
Antonio Sanchez de Bustamente y Sirven in Payment in Gold of Brazil-
ian Federal Loans Issued in France," where the Cuban jurist disagreed
with the majority opinion's willingness to consider French Court decisions
as guiding precedent. He interpreted the Agreement between the parties
to mean that the Court must look to municipal law to resolve the dispute.
The court should not, however, allow "itself to be guided or influenced by
the decisions of the national courts of the Parties. . . ."1 This basic re-
fusal to consider municipal court decisions as precedent clearly reflected
"0 See United States - Mexican Claims Commission of 1923, 1 OPINIONS OF COMMIS-
SIONERS 21. For an extensive discussion, see D. SHEA, supra note 45, at 194-230.
m Id. at 231.
'~' In 1961 a majority of the Inter-American Juridical Committee adopted a Report
relieving the State of all responsibility if "the alien has, by contract, renounced the diplo-
matic protection of his government, or if domestic legislation subjects the contracting alien
to the jurisdiction of the local courts, or if it places him in a similar status with nationals for
all purposes of the Contract." The United States delegate on the Committee filed a minority
report in which he protested that Calvo Clause could not condone "a denial of justice or any
other violation of international law by a State," see M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 931 (1967).
1'" Judge Bustamante of Cuba (1922-1939); Judge Pessoa of Brazil (1922-1930); Judge
Guerrero of El Salvador (1931-1939); and Judge Urrutria of Colombia (1931-1939).
", See 2 WORLD COURT REPORTS 402 (M. Hudson ed. 1935).
11 Id. at 435.
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Bustament's Latin American legal training which accords stare decisis
and judicial precedent little importance."'
VI. THE YEARS OF ASSERTION: 1945-1980
A. The New International Arena
During the last 35 years Latin American states have become more
aggressive in attempts to alter accepted international norms by recourse
to international fora. Their efforts were greatly assisted by the establish-
ment of the United Nations where they now assumed elder statesmen
roles, as new states in Africa and Asia emerged into the international
arena. At the same time the rivalry between Soviet and the U.S. power
blocs produced a precarious nuclear stalemate which neutralized any will-
ingness of the super powers to engage in armed intervention in weaker
non-client States.117 Numerous international resolutions rejecting military
and economic intervention in the affairs of other states further discour-
aged a recudescence of past misdeeds and emboldened the Latin Ameri-
cans to abandon their defensive posture and assert their preferences with
renewed conviction.
The Latin American States played an active part at the United Na-
tions and its related institutions from their earliest days, utilizing them as
new arenas in which to obtain legal approval and recognition of their
strongly held beliefs on sovereignty, equality of states, and a limited in-
.terpretation of the law of states responsibility. While they were not al-
ways successful, their efforts and impact was undeniable.
For example, Latin American nations participated fully in the Inter-
national Law Commission established by the General Assembly in 1947 to
promote development and codification of international law. Draft conven-
tions were prepared on issues important to Latin America, such as fishing
rights and the continental shelf. Indeed, Latin America's contribution on
the Commission to the development of the maritime law of the sea at
various United Nations conferences is well-documented.116
But United Nations efforts to agree on codifications of the law of
11 Under Latin American legal theory a judge who rendered a decision which pur-
ported to constitute binding precedent for future decisions would be usurping legislative or
executive functions, See F. DAWSON & I. HEAD, supra note 40, at 161-62.
118 Id. at 43.
130 See, e.g., Garcia-Amador, The Latin American Contribution to Law of the Sea, 68
AM. J. INT'L L. 33 (1964); Pohl, Latin America's Influence and Role in the Third Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea, 7 OCEAN DEVELOP. & INT'L L.J. 65 (1979). The African nations
particularly have cooperated with the Latin American States in this area, demonstrating the
ability of Latin America to remove certain issues from a regional to a hemispheric context,
see Morris, Influence and Innovation in the Law of the Sea: Latin America and Africa, 7
OCEAN DEVELOP. & INT'L L.J. 1 (1979).
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state responsibility, especially regarding alien property rights, achieved
no greater success than prior attempts sponsored by the League of Na-
tions. As in the 1920's, the Rapporteur was a Latin American, F.V. Gar-
cia-Amador. 119 In 1961, he produced an impressive series of reports for
the International Law Commission which bore the imprint of Latin
American thought on compensation, exhaustion of local remedies and
non-intervention. Although these drafts and revisions have yet to win the
approval of all the diverse interest groups represented on the Commis-
sion, they constitute a primary source for Latin American views on inter-
national law.120
Other Latin American aspirations to alter or extend traditional inter-
national law have been even less successful. Motions by Uruguay in 1948
to incorporate into the Declaration of Human Rights recognition of diplo-
matic asylum were failures, despite hemispheric acceptance of this con-
cept in a series of treaties dating from 1889.121 The efforts to internation-
alize hemispheric diplomatic asylum via the International Court of
Justice did not bear fruit in Haya de la Torre Case (Colombia v. Peru).122
The Court denied the validity of a grant of diplomatic asylum to Haya de
la Torre, a Peruvian political dissident. In interpreting the 1928 Havana
Convention on Political Asylum, the Court refused to "admit that the
States signatory to the Havana Convention intended to substitute for the
practice of the Latin American republics ... a legal system which would
guarantee to their own nationals accused of political offenses the privilege
of evading national jurisdictions. '"1I 8 This, the majority opined, would
amount to political intervention in the affairs of another state, a concept
rejected at the same Havana Conference. Moreover, Colombia, which had
granted the asylum at its embassy in Lima, had no right "to qualify the
nature of the offence (of which Haya was accused) by a unilateral and
definitive decision binding on Peru. ''11
Alejandro Alvarez, now a member of the Court, took the opportunity
in his dissenting opinion to reaffirm his belief in the existence of a Euro-
pean, an American, a Soviet and an emerging Asian international law, all
'g Director, Department of Legal Affairs, Gemeral Secretariat of the Organization of
American States.
120 See F. DAWSON & I. HEAD, supra note 40, at 41.
'21 See Nayar, The Right of Asylum in International Law: Its Status and Prospects, 17
ST. Louis L. REv. 17, 20, 41 (1972).
"' Asylum case, [1950] I.C.J. 266.
'13 Id. at 285.
124 Id. at 288. Four years later, the American Convention on Diplomatic Asylum signed
at Caracas resolved any doubts by specifically providing that the State granting the asylum
could determine "the nature of the offense or the motive for the prosecution", see Nayar,
supra note 121, at 41.
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of which "are not subordinated to universal law, but correlated to it.'" 5
The American international law, Alvarez explained, was derived from at-
tempts by the Latin American nations to modify international law and
"to bring it into harmony with the interests and aspirations of the conti-
nent."' s Moreover, American international law influenced and shaped
universal international law, and "many concepts or doctrines of American
origin have achieved or tend to achieve universal acceptance .... 127
The creation of the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1948
reemphasized the belief of Latin American jurists in the existence of a
regional international law, as well as reaffirmed the vitality of such long-
standing hallmarks of Latin American international legal thought as non-
intervention. The Inter-American Council of Jurist and its permanent
committee, the Inter-American Juridical Committee, were created as or-
gans of the OAS to promote the codification and evolution of a body of
Latin American law on diplomatic asylum, the protection of human
rights, arbitration, treaties, and the law of the sea. In 1958 their report,
Contribution of the American Continent to the Principles of Interna-
tional Law that Governs the Responsibility of the State, listed six princi-
ples which the Committee majority considered to embody Latin American
international law: (1) intervention in a state's internal or external affairs
was rejected; (2) contractual debts could not be collected by force even
where the debtor state refused to arbitrate or comply with an arbitral
award; (3) states were not responsible for acts or omissions to aliens ex-
cept where they owed their own nationals the same responsibility; (4)
states were not responsible for crimes committed in their territory but
only from inexcusable negligence or unwillingness to prevent or punish it;
(5) states were not responsible for injuries to aliens caused by Acts of
God, including insurrection and Civil war; and (6) state responsibility was
discharged when it gave aliens access to courts, in which event a protect-
"25 Id. at 294.
I d. at 293.
Id. at 294. Unfortunately he is not specific on this point. Although it might be an
overstatement to assert that Alvarez was an exponent of judge-made law, and therefore
atypical by traditional Latin American legal standards, his dissent in Adversory Opinion On
Reservations To The Convention On Genocide [1949] I.C.J. 50, perhaps illustrates his belief
that the International Court can create new international law. "As a result of the great
changes in international life that have taken place since the last social cataclysm it is neces-
sary that the Court should determine the present state of the law in each case which is
brought before it and, when needed, act constructively in this respect; it is at liberty to
develop international law, and indeed create law. . . .for it is impossible to define exactly
where the development of this law ends and its creation begins." Quoted in Leonhard, supra
note 17, at 678. Although as a former law professor of the author used to remark "we don't
pay off on dissenting opinions," minority positions have a way over time of becoming the
prevailing norm. For that reason dissents such as those of Alvarez are important.
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ing state could not intervene diplomatically.12'
The U.S. delegate on the Committee objected that the third principle
should contain an exception where the alien's treatment contravened in-
ternational law. The U.S. delegate also maintained that the fifth principle
was too broad and the sixth principle was completely unacceptable.1" A
subsequent draft adopted by the committee at its 1961 meeting relieved a
state of all responsibility if the alien had by contract renounced diplo-
matic protection, if domestic legislation subjected the contracting alien to
the jurisdiction of the local courts, or if it placed him or her in a similar
status with nationals for all purposes of the contract. 1"0 These reports and
the objections they precipitated illustrate the intractibility of present
levels of discussion.
B. Wealth Deprivations as Challenges to Traditional International
Law
By 1943 the last of the lump sum settlement compensation arrange-
ments arising out of the wealth deprivations of the 1910 Revolution had
been resolved by the United States and Mexico. The Mexican takings,
however, merely foreshadowed the spate of deprivations of alien property
which occurred in Eastern Europe between 1945 and 1949 pursuant to
legislation promising compensation far below the "prompt, adequate and
effective" standard. The Western Nations eventually settled the claims of
their deprived nationals through lump-sum compensation agreements ad-
ministered by permanent administrative bodies such as the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission in the United States and the Foreign
Compensation Commission of Great Britain. In no case did compensation
satisfy the traditional tests of international legality. 1 '
The example of the Eastern European seizures perhaps influenced
Latin America, where in 1952 Bolivia nationalized its land and foreign-
owned tin mines, and Guatemala expropriated alien-owned property."'
The most extreme challenge to date, not only to traditional legal concepts
but also to U.S. hemispheric hegemony, was the 1959 Cuban Revolution
and its subsequent seizure of alien (principally American) property. The
effect of the Cuban takings upon orthodox legal precepts was wide-rang-
ing. Twenty years before, the U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, had
categorically declaimed "the right to expropriate property is coupled with
" See 2 Y. B. INTERNAT. L. COMM. 136.
I" Id. at 136-37.
"8 See M. WHITEMAN, supra note 112.
181 For the best authoritative work to date on lump sum compensation agreements, see
R. LILLICH & B. WESTON, 1 & 2 INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR SETTLEMENT BY LUMP SUM
AGREEMENTS (1975).
13' Dawson & Weston, supra note 89, at 745 n.97; G. PENDLE, supra note 6, at 211-17.
1981
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and conditioned on the obligation to make adequate, effective and
prompt compensation. The legality of an expropriation is in fact depen-
dent upon the observance of the requirement.""' In 1960, although the
United States demanded "prompt, adequate, and effective" compensation
for its nationals deprived by the Cuban Agrarian Reform Law, it was ad-
mitted that this was a bargaining device used "to bring about negotia-
tions on the question of compensation .... "4 The change from the orig-
inal U.S. position is impressive.
The legality of the Cuban deprivations was challenged in United
States Federal District court in New York in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino. The Cuban legislation was deemed to violate international law
because it was retaliatory, discriminatory, and provided inadequate com-
pensation.3 5 The interest generated by the subsequent series of cases led
ultimately to a long-overdue reconsideration of the sovereign immunity
and act of state doctrines in the United States and in England. 186
Another interesting by-product of the Cuban-United States confron-
tation was the creation in 1964 of a procedure whereby the U.S. Foreign
Claims Commission was empowered to preadjudicate claims against Cuba
even in the absence of an overall lump-sum monetary settlement.1 3 7 Pre-
viously the Commission, like its English counterpart, had been entrusted
with establishing the validity of claims which were to be satisfied out of
the lump-sum monetary settlements already agreed upon by the depriv-
ing and protecting states. The preadjudication technique was a significant
departure from past international practice.
Cuba's nationalizations were followed by wealth deprivations in Peru
and Chile which, by similarly rejecting traditional compensatory prefer-
ences, added to the international literature and experience calling for a
modification of the law of state responsibility. Neither country offered
"prompt, adequate, and effective" compensation in the traditional sense,
although it could be argued that Peru's seizure of the International Petro-
leum Company (IPC) oil properties in 1969 was a "limited deprivation"
"3 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 112, at 1020.
1" Dawson & Weston, supra note 89, at 757 n.141.
1 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), affd. 307 F. 2d 845 (2d cir.), afl'd. 372 U.S. 905
(1963). The case law and commentaries are voluminus. See, e.g., Dawson & Weston, Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino: New Wine in Old Bottles, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 63 (1963);
Rabinowitz, Viva Sabbatino 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 697 (1977), and articles cited therein.
"' See The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891, 28
U.S. §1330 et. seq. (1976). Bird, The State Immunity Act of 1978: An English Update, 13
INT. LAW 619 (1979). Unfortunately, in the United States legislation Congress in withdraw-
ing immunity where international law was violated, defined such a violation to include, na-
tionalization which had not afforded "prompt, adequate and effective" compensation. Gol-
die, State Responsibility and the Expropriation of Property, 12 INT. LAW. 63, 75 (1978).
"' See Lillich, The Cuban Claims Act of 1964. 51, A.B.A.J. 445 (1965).
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to which traditional compensatory norms were applicable. Also the Peru-
vian takings were not in aid of a widespread social reform such as that
which inspired Mexican and Chilean nationalizations, but were directed
at a single alien company with which there had been a running dispute
for some years. The compensation formula was illusory, being related to
IPC's payment of back taxes from which it had previously been partially
exempted and which would exceed the amount of compensation offered,
as well as the company's asset value.138 The most significant impact on
international law of the Chilean' and Peruvian deprivations was in the
impulse which they gave to those international scholarly efforts seeking to
divert attention away from reiteration of ambiguous general "standards"
towards the more meaningful quest for means of valuing alien property
taken in the wealth deprivation process.14 0
C. Foreign Aid and Economic Integration as Sources of Confrontation
Although technical and military aid had been supplied to Latin
America since 1948, economic assistance had been so deemphasised that
in 1957 President Eisenhower told Congress that while Latin American
military and technical assistance should be maintained,"(e)conomic as-
sitance can be reduced. 14 1
This view changed dramatically after the Cuban Revolution caused
that basic reassessment of U.S. Latin American relations which
culminated in the 1961 Charter of Punta del Este. The Alliance for Pro-
gress envisioned at Punta del Este proposed a ten year economic and so-
cial development investment program, a substantial portion of which was
to be supplied by Latin American public and private capital. This initia-
tive generated an initial enthusiasm in Latin America and in the United
States, where eager young law school graduates hurried to Washington to
'3 For discussion of the Peruvian takings, see Rodley, The Nationalization by Peru of
the Holdings of the International Petroleum Company, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE
WESTERN HEMISPHERE 112 (N. Rodley & C. Ronning eds. 1974).
8 For a general survey of the Allende period, see Nogee & Sloan, Allende's Chile and
the Soviet Union: A Political Lesson for Latin American Nations Seeking Autonomy, 21 J.
INT'L STUDIES 339 (1979). For discussion of the legal questions raised by the deprivations,
see Vicuna, Some International Law Problems Posed by the Nationalization of the Copper
Industry by Chile, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 711 (1973).
140 "The disagreement in this area is not with respect to the requirement of compensa-
tion. It is centered on the manner in which the value of the property is determined", see
Sweeney, The Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of The United States and the
Responsibility of States of Injuries to Aliens, 16 SYR. L. RE V. 762, 764 (1965). Professor
Lillich addressed himself specifically to the valuation debate precipitated by the Chilean
deprivation, see Lillich, International Law and the Chilean Nationalizations - The Valua-
tion of the Copper Companies. 7 INT'L LAW. 124 (1973).
M Wilson, supra note 103, at 57.
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join in bringing economic and social justice to the hemisphere.1 4 2 One
wonders, however, if even the best-intentioned Latin American represent-
atives at Punta del Este were not a trifle skeptical at the prospect of re-
shaping economic and social structures which had persisted for centuries
and which many of their countrymen had little interest in seeing changed.
Money and aid were usefully employed under the Alliance. Nonethe-
less one hears, especially in the United States, that the Alliance "failed."
Although branding the Alliance a "failure" may partly derive from na-
tional propensities to expect instantaneous gratification and results even
in highly complex situations, the Alliance did raise higher expectations
than it was able to satisfy. It thereby increased a basic lack of confidence
in the capacity of free enterprise systems to redress social and economic
imbalances between developed and underdeveloped states. 1 4
Economic integration was considered in conjunction with the Alli-
ance as a method for increasing regional prosperity through the Latin
American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) and the Central American
Common Market (CACM). The Latin American regional economic inte-
gration movement owes its origin to the Economic Commission for Latin
America (ECLA) founded in 1948 as a suborganization of the United Na-
tions Economic and Social Council. From its headquarters in Santiago,
Chile, ECLA directed the studies, conferences, and negotiations that led
to the formation of the CACM in 1959 and LAFTA in 1960. But by 1965
it was apparent that the economic programs were not operating as origi-
nally conceived, and that renewed efforts were required.
The Andean Pact signed by Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru in
1969 (and later by Venezuela in 1973) sought to create an Andean Com-
mon Market (ACM) with virtually no trade barriers among its mem-
bers. 14 4 Like LAFTA and CACM, ACM aspirations are related to similar
attempts by Third World countries elsewhere to reform the international
economic system to obtain a better distribution of wealth. Through inte-
gration the Latin American Nations sought a self-generating and perpetu-
ating development which would free them from foreign dependence.1 45
"1 Arthur Schlesinger Jr., who had joined in the early formulation of Alliance policy,
recaptures the faith and optimism of the participants in the early days of the Alliance, see
Schlesinger Jr., The Alliance for Progress: A Retrospective, in LATIN AMERICA: THE SEARCH
FOR A NEW INTERNATIONAL ROLE 57 (R. Hellman & H. Rosenbaum eds. 1975). [hereinafter
cited as LATIN AMERICA].
143 "Was the Alliance for Progress a failure? .... Who knows? The Alliance was never
really tried. It lasted about a thousand days, not a sufficient test, and thereafter only the
name remained. Even that disappeared finally in the Nixon years." Id. at 83.
144 For history of ACM, see Murphy, Decision 24, Mexicanisation, and the New Eco-
nomic Order: The Anatomy of Disincentive, 13 TEx. INT'L L. J. 289 (1978).
14' See Vargas Hidalgo, Economic Integration Development Planning and Sovereignty:
A Latin American View, 9 LAW AM. 318, 319 (1977).
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The adoption of the Andean Pact Statute on Foreign Capital in 1971,
known generally as Decision 24, more than any other document reflects
the increasing Latin American apprehensions that economic sovereignty
is at the mercy of the efficiency and technology of large multinational
corporations. 1 6 Foreign capital investment is not considered good or evil
per se. The new emphasis is not upon taking over foreign investment, but
upon limiting and regulating its admission to, and activities within, the
host state. The aim is to channel foreign investment so that it can fulfill a
supporting rather than negative function in the process of integration and
economic development. In this sense the importance of Decision 24 and
its amendments cannot be ignored because it "may represent the most
concrete resolution of the foreign investment problem possible in Latin
America today, and perhaps the truest consensus in the entire Third
World."'"1 7 It is noteworthy that one of the chief architects of the Code
was Miguel Wioczeck of Mexico, "a country that has had a restrictive
policy towards foreign investment for almost a generation."' "
Decision 24 is particularly important because it represents the re-
gion's only multinational attempt to control investment. It derives from
an international treaty ratified by all signatories, and must be considered
part of the corpus of law applicable within Latin America. This regional
legal system strengthens Latin America's claim to be a regional legal sub-
order. Because it establishes a regime to regulate the admission and con-
tinuance of foreign investment, it also provides a new arena for interna-
tional confrontation, with the possibility that this in turn will produce an
impact on extra-hemispheric perceptions of international law. '
Provisions of special interest in ACM legislation include the "fade-
out" concept whereby foreign investors wishing to take advantage of the
ACM's duty-free internal trade must divest themselves of corporate con-
trol (down to 49 percent) over a 15 year, or in the case of Bolivia and
Ecuador, 20 year period. Any enterprise, however, may be 70 percent for-
eign-owned if the other 30 percent is held by the host state. These provi-
sions, especially in light of the limited function of stock markets in Latin
America, could be difficult to enforce without arousing fears of "creeping
, See Rodley, supra note 138, at 121-22. For a perceptive study of the issues raised by
multinational corporations, see Solomon, Multinational Corporations and the Emerging
World Order, 8 CASE W. REs. INT'L L. 329 (1976).
,,7 Furnish, The Andean Common Market's Common Regime for Foreign Investment,
5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 313, 314 (1972).
"0 Id. at 315.
1'9 Latin Americans have developed a cautious attitude towards foreign investment in
recent years, ". . . . which they often see through the lens of the dependency theory as
valuable only if carefully harnessed to specific needs and only if the investor agrees to relin-
quish control to national capital at an early date." See Furnish, Establishment of Mecha-
nisms for the Settlement of Economic Disputes, 5 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 145, 146 (1975).
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confiscation." Another potential point of conflict is Article 50 which dis-
torts the equal treatment standard because instead of guaranteeing aliens
equal treatment with nationals, it provides that foreign investors may not
receive treatment more favorable than that given national investors. This
wording "seems inferentially to negate the notion of a substantive inter-
national minimum standard."150 The spirit of Carlos Calvo dominates Ar-
ticle 51, which prohibits any clauses in investment or technology transfer
agreements purporting to oust local jurisdiction in the case of "possible
conflicts," thereby perhaps even forbidding subrogation of insurance
claims.151
The extent to which LAFTA, the CACM and the ACM may develop
and the success they achieve could be limited, according to Rafael Var-
gas-Hidalgo, a former professor at the Institute for International Affairs
at the University of Chile, because economic integration implies a re-
nouncing of a certain degree of sovereignty.15 2 Indeed the closer the inte-
gration sought, the more sovereignty must be surrendered. To work prop-
erly, Vargas-Hidalgo maintains that "an integration system in Latin
America would require at least some harmonisation of national politics,
and in a more perfect scheme, coordination of national plans and joint
planning."158 Unfortunately, this does not appear any more likely in the
near future than it was in the past when ". . . considerations based on
national sovereignty prevented the Latin American countries from reach-
ing higher levels of integration or from having established a system of
joint planning.'" Thus the sovereignty concept in which Latin America
has sought a defense against foreign aggression may prove to be a two-
edged sword. " '
,50 Oliver, The Andean Foreign Investment Code; A New Phase in the Quest for Nor-
mative Order as to Direct Foreign Investment, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 763, 769 (1972).
"I The article states in full: "In no instrument relating to investments or the transfer
of technology shall there be clauses that remove possible conflicts from the national jurisdic-
tion and competence of the recipient country or allow the subrogation by States to the
rights and actions of their national investors." Quoted in id. at 773. Also, "Article 51 seems
to hit hard ... at investment guarantees, insurance, arbitration, and international adjudica-
tion of foreign investors claims-a matter significant as to appraisals of climate for new
investments." Id.
] See Vargas Hidalgo, supra note 145, at 322.
Id. at 328.
Id. at 318.
" Chile resigned from the ACM in 1976 alleging a threat to its sovereignty. Bolivia
now threatens to leave the group, alleging intervention by the other Latin American States
which* criticized the excesses of its latest revolution, and the Peruvians have reservations
concerning the ACM's political and economic objectives, see Latin American Regional Re-
port, Oct. 3, 1980, at 1 (London). The recent brief war between Ecuador and Peru over a
disputed border also called into question the ACM's future, see Latin American Weekly
Report, Feb. 6, 1981, at 1-21 (London).
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This same stubborn adherence to an outmoded concept of sover-
eignty has impaired the growth of international mechanisms to resolve
disputes between alien investors and their host states." In the absence of
treaties settling past disputes and providing for claims commissions,
Latin American states have persistently refused to concede that invest-
ment disputes could be removed from municipal tribunals and submitted
to international adjudication. This Calvo Doctrine legacy accounts for
Latin America's rejection of the World Bank Convention for the Arbitra-
tion of Investment Disputes5 7 and for the shape which they have sought
to give the legal expression of the New International Economic Order.158
D. The New International Legal Order
In 1974 the Calvo Doctrine and other Latin American legal norms
received their greatest apotheosis to date with the enactment of the
United Nations Declaration on the Establishment of a New International
Economic Order15' and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States.16e
From the beginning, the Latin American nations played a leading
role in the formulation of the Declaration and the Charter. At an address
in 1972 at the Third Session of the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD), President Luis Echeverria of Mexico pro-
posed to obtain the developed states' consent to a legally binding set of
economic rights and duties which would favor Third World economies.
Since 1960 the world economy had turned against the lesser devel-
oped countries. Traditional economic institutions such as the World
Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the General Agreement on
'" See Rogers, Of Missionaries Fanatics and Lawyers: Some Thoughts on Investment
in the Americas, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (1978).
15 See Abbott, Latin America and International Arbitration Conventions: The Quan-
dary of Non-Ratification, 17 HARV. INT'L L. J. 131 (1976); Summers, Private Versus State
Arbitration in Latin America, 4 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 121 (1973).
188 Id. at 4-5. The durability of the Calvo Doctrine combined with the overriding desire
to control foreign investment was manifest in 1973 when Mexico enacted new technology
and investment legislation to restrict foreign enterprise. Although "Mexicanization" had
been in operation for some years, the 1973 legislation sought to codify, clarify and extend
prior enactments. Like the ACM Code, the Mexican legislation requires prior registration
and approval for all foreign investment and licensing agreements, and enshrines the Calvo
Clause. While the ACM Code is more gradual and flexible in approach, perhaps because it
was produced by a group of loosely aligned nations with differing views on foreign invest-
ment, the Mexican legislation reflects the "nationalist sentiment of a unified nation resolved
to dominate foreign capital within its borders, and is less apprehensive of discouraging new
foreign investors" than is the ACM Code, see Murphy, supra note 144, at 296.
119 G.A. Res. 3201, 6th Special Sess. U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. ) U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974).
,SO G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp, (No. 31) 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). [Here-
inafter cited as Charter].
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Tariffs and Trades (GATT), which were controlled by the wealthier na-
tions, seemed unable or unwilling to assist the impoverished nations in
the southern half of the globe. The economic gap between richer and
poorer countries widened steadily as did the imbalance in the terms of
trade.1 1 Not surprisingly, President Echeverria struck a sympathetic
chord when he urged a New International Economic Order which would
" ...reinforce the precarious legal foundations of international econ-
omy . . .removing economic cooperation from the realm of goodwill and
rooting it in the field of law by transferring consecrated principles of soli-
darity among men to the sphere of relations among nations." 12 Such a
doctrine would concede to States the right to adopt whatever economic
structure they deemed most suitable, to treat private property as the
public interest required, and to be freed from outside economic
pressures. 168
A working group to prepare a draft outline of the Charter's contents
was designated with Mexican Ambassador Jorge Castaneda as Chair-
man. 164 The initial intent was to set out those rights and duties of states
which should become part of the corpus of international law; merely codi-
fying existing precepts would not be enough.16 It soon became apparent,
however, that opinion was so diverse on certain issues that a charter em-
bodying legally binding prescriptions would be impossible to achieve. The
resulting General Assembly resolution, while technically not binding
under international law, reflected the expectations of a large portion of
the international community.
The Charter sought to globalize the Calvo Doctrine at the expense of
traditional international legal doctrines. Nowhere is this better illustrated
than in the attack on the law of state responsibility contained in Article 2
of the Charter. Article 2 rejects all diplomatic protection, enables a taking
state to decide unilaterally upon the compensation it will offer deprived
aliens, and provides that any disputes over compensation can only be set-
tled in the municipal courts of the taking state unless the latter "has
freely agreed otherwise."16' Professor Lillich described Latin American ef-
'' See Rozental The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and the New
International Economic Order, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 309, 310 (1976). See also W. BRANDr,
NORTH-SOUTH: A PROGRAMME FOR SURVIVAL 30 (1980).
162 U.N. Doc A/PV.2315, at 67 (1972).
's Brower & Tepe, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States: A Reflection
of International Law? 9 INT'L LAW. 294, 297 (1975).
'' See Rozental, supra note 161, at 313.
"Developing countries. . . argue that innovation and new rules of law are necessary
because the traditional rules of economic law are no longer valid and binding on States who
reached political and legal independence long after their formulation and on the basis of
situations totally different from the one existing over the past three decades." Id. at 315-16.
'" Rogers, supra note 156, at 4-5.
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forts on the Declaration and Charter as " . . . no more than thinly dis-
guised attempts to endow the Calvo Doctrine . .. with limited interna-
tional status. This development which would immunise States from
potential international responsibility by denying alien claimants the right
to seek the diplomatic protection of their States, is as unnecessary as it is
unfortunate. 1 7 In rejecting traditional international norms respecting
wealth deprivations the Charter seems to place the concept of state re-
sponsibility outside the realm of international law.
Even though not legally binding, certain features of the Charter have
created great misgivings in the international legal and investment com-
munities. Significantly, F. Garcia-Amador, now a law professor and for-
merly Rapporteur of the International Law Commission's efforts to codify
the law of state responsibility, seems to fear that the Charter has gone too
far. In a recent article he maintains that the Latin American countries are
not as eager as other Third World nations to repudiate entirely the doc-
trine of state responsibility.' 68 He admits that the Charter demonstrates
the non-Latin American Third World Nations' "approach to the law gov-
erning nationalization projects the image of a kind of emotional renais-
sance of the classic concept of absolute State Sovereignty - a concept
that was thought to be gone forever, if not in the Soviet Union, in the rest
of the world." 16
One is tempted to speculate if in their eagerness to become leaders in
promoting a new international economic order the Latin Americans have
not gone too far. They have indicated and internationalized their firm
intent to abolish diplomatic protection without suggesting an alternative
international problem solving mechanism to take its place.17 Their ef-
forts cannot fail to rebound on them at some future date, either through a
failure to attract the foreign investment they may require,' or because
at some stage in their future development they may discover themselves
on the wrong end of a wealth deprivation. 72
167 Lillich, The Diplomatic Protection of Aliens Abroad: An Elementary Principle of
International Law Under Attack 69 Am.J. INT'L L. 359, 361 (1975).
1" See Garcia-Amador, The Proposed New International Legal Order: A New Ap-
proach to the Law Governing Nationalization and Compensation, 12 LAw. AM. 1 (1980).
See also Latin America and the Creation of a New International Order, UNECLA/B (No.
19), 1/2 at 1-9 (1975).
"I Garcia-Amador, supra note 168, at 52.
170 The failure to present a suitable alternative in place of diplomatic interposition was
considered one of the reasons behind the rejection of the Calvo Doctrine by late Nineteenth
Century European and American lawyers, see D. SHEA, supra note 45, at 20.
17 See Dawson, The Role of the Private Banker in the New International Economic
Order 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 297, 306 (1976).
172 Professor Lillich has written that "in recommending normative guidelines and pro-
cedural sanctions .... the 'mirror image' principle must be kept in mind: namely, that the
claims one projects against others inevitably will be reflected in similar claims against one-
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VII. FUTURE PERSPECTIVES
The foregoing chronological examination of selected past confronta-
tions between the Latin American legal sub-order and the value systems
of other states demonstrates a three-fold impact upon international law.
First, the development and content of international state practices of
non-Latin American origin, such as the law of state responsibility and
related rules governing the minimum international standard of justice,
diplomatic protection of nationals, and exhaustion of local remedies, have
been reshaped and refined by Latin American publicists, negotiators, and
litigators before national and international courts and claims
commissions.
Second, new legal concepts have been introduced to the non-Latin
American international community, some of which have been accorded
international convention or treaty status. The Drago Doctrine proscribing
the use of armed force to collect debts, and the concepts of non-interven-
tion and extended coastal jurisdiction over maritime resources are exam-
ples. Other doctrines, such as diplomatic asylum, have not as yet obtained
wide acceptance.
Third, persistent invocation of policy preferences relating to sover-
eignty over natural resources, exclusive jurisdiction of municipal tribu-
nals, the supremacy of local law in wealth deprivation situations, and in-
sistence upon waiver by aliens of rights to diplomatic protection, has
eroded the traditional problem-solving techniques and formulae available
to the foreign offices of claimant or protecting states. It would, for exam-
ple, be counter-productive today to challenge the validity of a nationali-
zation by citing pre-1945 precedents or by insisting upon "prompt, ade-
quate, and effective" compensation.
The legal experience of the past is surely but a prelude to that of the
future. In view of the economic disparities dividing the world community,
confrontation will not only continue, but will accelerate. Latin American
states will increasingly assume extrahemispheric leadership roles, through
alliances with other parts of the under-developed world, will seek to alter
patterns of international economic life which formerly led them to view
themselves as "members of weak, externally penetrated societies in which
great powers, multinational corporations, and international economic re-
lationships play important roles. '17 8
The resentment felt by the Latin American nations and other lesser-
developed nations at what they perceive to be past injustices and the ap-
self," see Lillich, Economic Coercion and the International Legal Order, 51 INT'L AFF. 358,
365 (1975).
113 Milenky, Problems, Perspectives and Modes of Analysis: Understanding Latin
American Approaches to World Affairs, LATIN AMERICA, supra note 142, at 93, 107.
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parent reluctance of the industrialized nations voluntarily to alter the ec-
onomic patterns of centuries must be of concern to internationalists
throughout the world community. Instead of focusing primarily on such
matters as establishing dispute resolving mechanisms, the, real issue to
which attention should be directed is deciding what kind of order is desir-
able for both developed and developing nations and how to achieve it.
Otherwise the ominous recent warnings of the Brandt Commission Report
may prove disturbingly prophetic.174
Assessing the effect of future confrontations upon international law
can only be made as they occur, but past experience in Latin America
suggests there is a discernable process of confrontation which can be use-
ful in assessing international legal impact. In retrospect one is struck by
the wide number and identities of participants who carry out the confron-
tation and determine its force and direction. Similarly diverse are the are-
nas in which the confrontation may be aired, ranging from courts to the
pages of a law review. The claims which precipitate the confrontation
may vary over a period of time. Thus, claims relating to political and
territorial integrity in the century after independence were later replaced
by claims to assert economic independence and control over natural re-
sources. A claim relating to a refusal to meet traditional compensatory
standards which would have been rejected in 1930 might be allowed to-
day. Finally, the immediate effects and eventual outcomes may also
change with time and geography.
It is perhaps useful, therefore, to attempt imposition of some analyti-
cal order on this process of confrontation that has in the past, and will
surely in the future, affect Latin America's impact on international law.
The following outline is offered to aid understanding and analysis of a
complicated, constantly evolving aspect of international legal develop-
ment. It is applicable not only to Latin America but, with modification, to
Asia and Africa as well.
THE PROCESS OF CONFRONTATION
A. Participants
1. Foreign offices or other government agencies
2. Judges and arbitrators
3. Commentators
4. Officials in regional bodies, e.g. OAS
M7 There were two Latin Americans on the Brandt Commission, which concluded:
"Whatever their differences and however profound, there is a mutuality of interest between
North and South. The fate of both is intimately connected. The search for solutions is not
an act of benevolence but a condition of mutual survival." See W. BRANDT, supra note 161,
at 281-82.
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5. Officials in international bodies, e.g. U.N.
B. Arenas
1. International Court of Justice
2. Regional Courts
3. Claims and Arbitration Tribunals
4. Municipal courts
5. Regional bodies
6. International bodies
7. International conferences
8. Publications.
C. Claims Leading to Confrontation
1. Claims relating to Political Sovereignty
(a) Claims relating to non-intervention
(i) political/diplomatic intervention
(ii) economic intervention
(iii) armed intervention
(iv) ideological intervention
(b) Claims relating to self-defense
(i) arising from extrahemispheric action
(ii) arising from interhemispheric action
2. Claims relating to Economic Sovereignty
(a) over natural resources
(i) sub-soil resources
(ii) marine resources
(b) over economic activities relating to national secur-
ity e.g. national control of airlines, railways, com-
munications, insurance, banking.
(c) over economic activities relating to control of local
labor and markets.
3. Claims relating to social and judicial integ-
rity
(a) over exclusive jurisdiction of municipal courts and
exhaustion of local remedies
(b) over rejection of diplomatic interposition
(i) absolute
(ii) modified in event of denial of justice
(c) over rejection of international arbitration in dis-
putes between aliens and States.
D. Immediate Effects
(a) Regional level
(b) International level
E. Eventual Outcome
(a) Regional level
(b) International level
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The lack of date of an interrelated overview of the development of
Latin American legal attitudes and their impact upon the international
world order is disturbing. It hinders our ability to perceive, if not influ-
ence, the shape and direction of future events. ' Latin America has been,
is, and will continue to be a legal "confrontation area"17 between norms
of purported universal application, and newer legal concepts moulded by
the faith that the human condition need not forever be blighted by mass
poverty, disease, hunger and unresponsive political, social and economic
structures.
175 It is not generally appreciated that other areas, such as the East Indies, also may
have had special impacts upon international legal development. Professor Alexandrowicz in
a thought-provoking and perceptive work deplores the willingness of European, and even
Asian, commentators to refuse to recognize that the Indian subcontinent (including Burma,
Ceylon, Siam and Indonesia) was an active participant in the development of the law of the
family of nations in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries. He argues that "it seems questiona-
ble to uphold the traditional view that the law of nations grew up exclusively in the confines
of Christian Europe." Rather, the treaty and diplomatic relations between European States
and Indian Sovereigns affected the development of international legal concepts, including
the "law" of war and the law of diplomacy. Hugo Grotius, who had been employed by one of
the large Dutch trading companies, was influenced by the maritime traditions of the Indian
Ocean when he came to evolve his theories concerning freedom of the seas, see C. ALEXAN-
DROWICZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS IN THE EAST INDIES 1,
229 (1967).
Mie In future, United States' preeminence as the principal focus of Latin American dis-
content may be diminishing as other nations, especially Japan and West Germany, become
increasingly involved economically in the region. The division of opinion between the
United States and West Germany's Social Democratic government over the best policy to
pursue when dealing with social revolutions in Central America is already apparent, and
signals European readiness to challenge United States leadership in the area. "There seems
little doubt that a fundamental difference in outlook on Central America now exists between
Bonn and Washington. As far as the Germans are concerned, the United States is wrong to
continue supporting military regimes in Central America and the Caribbean that have no
future. The German view is that short-term instability is the necessary price to pay to en-
sure stability in the long run." See Latin America Weekly Report, 22 Aug. 1980, at 3-4
(London).

